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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The research interest of this dissertation concerns financial accountability and the reporting of 
empowering and advocacy nonprofit organizations (NPOs). NPOs differ from businesses in 
their missions, revenue acquisition (Mitchell, 2014), stakeholder interactions (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008; Rupp, Kern & Helmig, 2014) and performance evaluations (Chenhall, Hall & 
Smith, 2012; Cordes &Coventry, 2010; Hall, 2014).  
The phenomenon of nonprofit accountability has received significant research attention during 
the past twenty years (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006, 2010; Kilby, 2004; Ebrahim, 2003, 2010; 
Assad & Goddard ,2010; Chenhall et al., 2012; Mook & Handy, 2010; Cordes &Coventry, 
2010; McCarthy, 2007; Saxton, Jenn-Shyong & Ho, 2012; Verbruggen, Christiaens & Milis, 
2011; Schmitz, Raggo & Vijfeijken, 2012). Accounting literature provides a plethora of 
definitions and classifications for nonprofit accountability. These definitions vary regarding 
their focus, scope, paradigms of applied philosophy and approaches. Any single definition, 
however, typically highlights but one particular aspect of this complex phenomenon. 
Accountability could be defined in very broad terms as “acknowledging… responsibility for 
and being transparent about the impacts of …policies, decisions, actions … and associated 
performance” (AA1000 Accountability Principles Standard, 2008, p. 6). In a very specific way, 
accountability can be described as “reporting on the control and uses of resources by those 
accountable for their control and use… to whom they are accountable” (Bromwich, 1992, p. 
310). Kilby (2004) emphasizes that in addition to functional reporting, the accountability 
relationships of NPOs and their stakeholders encompass power, authority, and ownership 
aspects.  
Even though the current research agenda is moving towards prioritizing the need to explore the 
accountability of NPOs to their beneficiaries (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007, 2010; Ebrahim, 
2010), there are significant reasons to continue investigating the financial accountability of 
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NPOs. These reasons include the persistence of financial scandals (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; 
Bothwell, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011) and the legitimacy crisis in the nonprofit sector (ICHRP, 
2003; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009), broad areas that are susceptible to financial manipulations 
(Sidel, 2005), and a widespread perception of the need for higher levels of financial discipline 
(Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Saxton et al, 2012).  
All these factors support a general call for increasing the financial transparency and 
accountability of NPOs (McCarthy, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Schmitz et al., 
2012) and an advocacy for new forms of financial reporting on donations (Keating & Frumkin, 
2003; Ryan, Mack, Tooley & Irvine, 2014). In order to accommodate these demands by 
“extensive academic examination of … accountability in specific …contexts” (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008, p. 819), this dissertation aims to explore the phenomenon of the financial 
accountability of human rights organizations (HROs) from broad institutional, socio-political, 
and organizational perspectives. The research is grounded on an intellectual perspective of 
interpretivism and presupposes an interdisciplinary approach. The study applies the 
triangulation of research methods and theoretical frameworks.  
In order to explore NPO accountability, prior literature examined empirically researched cases 
of hospitals (Schlesinger, Mitchell & Gray, 2004), churches (Laughlin, 1990; McCarthy, 2007), 
charities (Gourdie & Rees, 2009; Knutsen & Brower, 2010), and cooperatives (Monsen, 2010), 
but little research has yet been done on the accountability of human rights organizations 
(Candler, 2001; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). In the present circumstances of their operations 
and the state of scholarly research, as this dissertation discerns it, HROs face the highest level 
of financial accountability demands among NPOs. The attention they must pay to the propriety 
of their donors and their concern for public expectations and scrutiny encourages HROs not to 
compromise their declared principles and crucial values. HROs also must address the power of 
institutional donors in settling accountability frameworks, cope with a condition that human 
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rights issues too often have a low priority in the eyes of individual donors and acknowledge 
that these issues are enmeshed within complex relationships with governments. 
The accountability of HROs is closely related to significant phenomena of human rights 
concerns and problems and the emergence over a long period of a “rights-based” approach to 
development. Human rights as complex phenomena are a product of continuous philosophical 
debate, are crucial, indeed basic and fundamental, characteristics of human existence, and are 
often held up a universal standard of social systems judgment (Heard, 1997). Since the 
establishment of the United Nations, the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
has found its moral, social and political support in the principles of the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted by the Third United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.  
In the contemporary context, HROs are those nonprofit organizations that are not merely 
“agencies providing technical expertise” (ICHRP, 2003, p. 1), but are the representatives of 
value of human rights “that are concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights 
in the long term” (Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004, p. 591). HROs play an important role in 
international and local arenas (Matlary, 2002). The HRO “community” is characterized by the 
global, international and dynamic development with its focus on information sharing, 
partnership and networking, communications and capacity building, the expansion of liberation.  
HROs are tasked with enforcing transnational and domestic activities and responding 
effectively and rapidly to crucial issues of human interaction, justice and social order.  
There are no precise statistical enumerations of HROs; however, it is a plausible estimate that 
more than four hundred of HROs are operating globally around the world (Tsutsui & Wotipka, 
2004).  There is a variety in the size, structure and mission emphasis among these organizations. 
For example, HROs differ very much in their sizes and operating arenas (from small local 
organizations to the world’s largest HRO, Amnesty International with its 2.8 million employees 
and volunteers, operating across 150 countries). Their sizes, organizational structures and 
4 
 
declared mission priorities normally do in and of themselves give a clear idea about the potential 
weight of their individual and collective contributions to the advancement and protection of 
specific human rights and the human rights phenomenon understood as a social and moral 
movement of global significance.  
Sweeping global humanitarian challenges set the parameters and the specific agendas for HROs 
which, for example, focus particular attention to the following issues in their mission statements 
and programs, in their activism:1  
terrorism,  freedom of religion,  
enforced disappearances,  health and human rights,  
slavery,  demands for dignity,  
death penalty abolishment,  detention and imprisonment,  
armed conflicts,  economic,social and cultural rights,  
arms trade,  human rights education,  
corporate social responsibility,  indigenous people,  
discrimination,  poverty, 
sexual orientation and gender identity,  refugees, 
human rights of women and children,  migrants and internally displaced persons, 
freedom of expression, protection of human rights defenders. 
freedom of assocoation,   
                                                            
1  According to the inspected program documents of Amnesty International, “Free the Slavers”, Helsinki 
Commettees and Groups, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). 
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In addition to this comprehensive “sample agenda”, as a part of transnational advocacy 
networks, HROs accuse politicians of passivity with regard to the human rights of their citizens, 
HROs speak out to address situations of the isolation and control of domestic press and NPOs 
by governments, They play a catalytic role in shaping the emerging norms, policies and 
practices of human rights (Tronvoll, Grimsrud, Havnevik & Rembe, 1996; Matlary, 2002). Due 
to these functions, HROs are often called “watchdogs” of governments, politicians and 
businesses.  
The challenges of the global environment and the critical importance of fulfilling stakeholders’ 
expectations determine that HROs have increased accountability that results in their “openness 
[and transparency] … to being judged” (Cordes & Coventry, 2010, p. 249). In order to gain  a 
better understanding of the modern challenge of HROs for greater accountability, it is crucial 
to pay attention to the transition from the charity model  and a needs-based approach to 
development and humanitarian activities toward the so-called rights-based approach (RBA) 
reviewed in particular programs  and to a general oversight of the practices of HROs, their 
donors and international institutions (Hansen & Sano, 2006).  
RBA is “a framework that integrates the norms, principles, standards and goals of the 
international human rights system into the plans and processes of development” (Boesen & 
Martin, 2007, p. 9; see also O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). RBA 
implementation increases demand of accountability from “duty bearers” which include not only 
the state authorities, but also the wide group of non-state actors (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall, 
2004). HROs that implement RBA are required to present a high level of transparency that 
supports the ability of “partners, stakeholders and oversight mechanisms to have access to 
relevant information, including financial information” (Boesen & Martin, 2007, p. 30).  
The explicit focus of this dissertation on financial accountability of HROs and the declared 
objectives of the research have resulted in three studies (essays). These essays shed light on a 
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phenomenon that is considered from the perspectives of three different actors: nonprofit 
practitioners, institutional donors, and regulation in a specific socio-political context. 
The first essay, “Human Rights Organizations: Financial Accountability and Accounting 
Challenges,” explores several angles of HRO financial accountability by applying the multiple 
lenses of resource dependence, legitimacy and stakeholder theories and acquiring knowledge 
of the main concerns of HRO professionals within the nonprofit community. I approach this by 
introducing netnography (Kozinets, 2010) as a method in accounting research and conducting 
a hermeneutic study that permits the discovery of the practices, challenges and concerns of 
accounting and fundraising practitioners within the scope of Internet–based professional 
discussions.  
The essay shows a linkage between the complexities in performance measurement and 
accounting and the difficulties for HROs to demonstrate legitimacy and accountability. The 
study acknowledges the exaggerated focus of HROs on relationships with their donors and 
notes the increasing fundraising competition, which forces nonprofit managers to use business 
approaches to fundraising and business terminology. At the same time, NPOs do not support 
business-oriented performance measurement. They emphasize that such measurement does not 
accurately represent the success or failure of any NPO but may force these organizations to 
manipulative actions and make it necessity for them to hire professional fundraisers and 
consultants. This leads to resource outflows that may detract from the missions of the HRO. 
The essay advances a significant argument for the development of a special accounting 
framework for NPOs. The study provides empirical evidence that the existing framework and 
practice has significant limitations and is burdened with complexity, duality and controversy, 
especially in cases of revenue recognition, costs allocation and reporting. In this context, 
accountants are forced to manipulative actions to accommodate NPO financial activities to 
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accounting standards. The research recognizes a significant demand by practitioners for an 
accounting framework for NPOs that is more relevant to the nonprofit context.  
Considering accounting as a user-oriented practice (Hyndman, 1990; Mayson, 1992) with 
accountability and decision-making objectives (Mellemvik, Monsen & Olson, 1988), the 
second essay, “Accounting Information Demands of Institutional Donors from a Human 
Rights Organization in Norway: Parallel Reporting Realities,” explores the accounting 
information needs of institutional donors.  It examines their reasoning and motives for high 
financial accountability demands, their outcomes for the nonprofit sector, and the linkage 
between annual financial reporting and the alternative reporting systems created by the donors. 
The nonprofit accounting practices are challenged by a trend toward harmonization with 
business accrual accounting principles despite their irrelevance to NPOs (Keating and Frumkin, 
2003; Christiaens and Rommel, 2008), and the inconsistency between standards and practice 
(Conolly and Hyndman, 2000; Hooper, Sinclair & Hui, 2008).  The contemporary situation 
demonstrates an insufficient level of information quality (Torres and Pina, 2003; Ryan et al., 
2014), the non-correspondence of this information with stakeholder demands (McDowell, Li & 
Smith, 2013), and failure to address crucial specific reporting issues (Mook and Handy, 2010).   
In addition, Conolly, Hyndman & McConville (2013) report on the low interest of potential 
users in official financial reports of nonprofits. Within the contemporary context, it is also 
important to note that institutional donors have enough power to require as much accounting 
information as they need from the supported HROs. Exercising this power, they often demand 
special financial control and reporting (ICHRP, 2003; Ebrahim, 2003; 2010; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008; Assad & Goddard, 2010). Prior research has acknowledged institutional donor-
NPO tensions in relation to reporting and the establishment of its targets (Clayton, 1994; 
Hudock, 1999; Fowler, 1997). Ebrahim (2003, 2010) identified the mechanisms of donor 
influence and charted NPO resistance shaped in the forms of information flows.  
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Aiming to unpack and understand the reasoning of institutional donors, this essay applies the 
analytical lenses of institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, 2004). I argue that 
systematization and analysis of outputs (i.e. expressed values, accounting information priorities 
and demands of institutional donors) could increase our understanding of the specific logics 
(inputs) which underlie and determine these actions. The essay undertakes a case study of a 
Norwegian human rights organization, the Rafto Foundation, and applies a triangulation of 
qualitative research methods (Modell, 2009; Hopper & Hoque, 2006), including interviews with 
an embedded real-life construct (Lapsley & Llewellyn, 1995; Hellstrom & Lapsley, 2016).  This 
procedure contextualizes qualitative and quantitative accounting information and thus provides 
respondents with an alternative scenario aimed at facilitating their discussions and supporting 
the researcher’s subsequent analysis.  
The study shows that in a situation where official financial statements do not provide users with 
sufficient accounting information, these powerful stakeholders (the institutional donors) 
establish supplementary (parallel) reporting systems, using their own perceptions on 
accountability and legitimacy determined by embedded logics and patterns of governance. 
These two different reporting systems contradict one another on the level of information 
aggregation and applied accounting principles. The institutional donors influence the reporting 
practices of the HRO by determining the accountability level, requiring parallel 
(supplementing) reports, suggesting the form and frequency of reporting, assisting in quality 
improvement, and linking extensiveness  of reporting with the level of uncertainty/risk and the 
size of the grant. Such influence also involves a requirement of internal control, oversight of 
the application of restricted funds, and the creating of the image of “ideal” NPO-partner. The 
case study shows that the desire to control is the initial motivator of these processes. The level 
of control is determined by the level of expected risk, legitimacy and reputation, the donors 
trust, NPO dependence and the size and condition of investment. There are several instruments 
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applied for controlling the risk and elimination of uncertainty, including different levels of 
reporting that are required for different projects and from different NPOs, disclosing the sources 
of revenues, gaining a capacity to demonstrate revenues from other sources. The desire of the 
institutional donors to work only with long-term trustworthy NPO-partners and with well-
established large-scale professional NPOs makes it extremely difficult for newer small- and 
medium-scale NPOs to compete for funding.  
In this essay, I identify both positive and negative outcomes of the financial accountability 
demands of institutional donors from the HRO. The positive outcomes include sanitary 
purposes (an ability to identify HROs financial impropriety), educational purposes (providing 
feedback to the HRO on their financial reports, improving the reporting forms and manuals), 
and increases in the financial discipline of the HRO. The possible negative outcomes of donors’ 
financial accountability demands include an absence of  a clear borderline between demanding 
information for reporting purposes and direct intervention in organizational activities; reporting 
overload; inability to exercise control over the most efficient way of spending; the limitation of 
NPOs by the concept of an ideal NPO-partner.  
The third essay, “Mechanisms of Financial Reporting and Accounting Regulation for 
Foreign Funding Restrictions: A Case of Human Rights Organizations in Russia,” 
explores the role of financial reporting and accounting regulation in foreign funding restrictions. 
It proceeds by analysing outcomes and consequences of an abrupt change of financial reporting 
and accounting framework on an institutional field of HROs in the case of the implementation 
of the “foreign agents” law in Russia. This essay contributes to critical accounting literature 
(Neu, 2000; Davie, 2005) by examining the role of accounting in a modern non-liberal socio-
political context, exploring the spectrum of governing purposes for which accounting 
mechanisms could be applied, and considering the interplay between accounting and various 
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notions of justification, politics (Miller, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; Skærbæk & Melander, 
2004) and power (Burns, 2000; Collier, 2001). 
Foreign funding of NPOs is restricted in more than fifty countries, mostly in emerging 
(transition) and developing economies (Sidel & Moore, 2015; Christensen & Weinstein, 2013). 
Even though, the power exercised by some individual governments demonstrates their 
straightforward capacity directly restrict or even ban foreign funding of NPOs, some 
governments choose to mobilize indirect mechanisms of advancing financial reporting and 
accounting regulation and requirements for their restrictive purposes.  
The essay undertakes an exploratory study of the “foreign agents” law in Russia by means of a 
document and media analysis. In 2012, Russia established a new financial reporting and 
accounting regulation over NPOs that were engaged in “political activism” and funded by 
foreign donors.  The regulation is particularly focused on HROs. The new regulation 
complicates bookkeeping, mandates more frequent and a more extensive scope of reporting, 
and requires HROs to register as “foreign agents.” The law had a dramatic effect on the 
operationalization of HROs in Russia. Traditionally Russian HROs were financed mainly by 
grants of large overseas foundations (Jacobson, Mersiyanova & Efremov, 2012). Under the new 
regulatory regime, HROs had to conduct new campaigns for collecting money from individual 
donors in Russia in order to continue the program activities that previously had been funded 
with outside sources.  
In the context of two oppositely directed international trends (increasing transparency and 
restricting foreign funding), the “foreign agents” law increases the legitimization of regulatory 
actions. The essay provides new evidence in support of the social research claim that hybrid 
and democratizing regimes are seeking more delicate mechanisms for the governance and 
control of the nonprofit sectors of their societies as compared to the fully-authoritarian ones of 
the recent past (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013). The study notes that within specific settings 
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it is deemed necessary to achieve the restriction of foreign funds and limit their influence on 
institutions that operation within the society by mobilizing indirect accounting and reporting 
mechanisms of governance. Such purposes are being sought by means of (at least) a moderate 
level of legislation and an incremental tightening of the regulatory system.  The studied case 
demonstrates stakeholder change and shifts in power on the institutional field of human right 
activism in Russia from foreign donors to the state (represented by the regulators and 
inspectors). These shifts are related to  the transformation of accountability centers and 
influential actors who now have the power to claim and satisfy their accountability demands 
from the foreign donors to the state.  This is because newer  non-state donors within Russian 
society tend to be passive and do not demand HROs accountability. New visibilities (such as 
the legal status of “foreign agent” and a “foreign agents” register), mechanisms of selectiveness 
and exclusion that empower external controllers, and deep interventions into the lifeworld of 
the governable objects signal the disciplining power of the law on the Russian nonprofit sector. 
Strong reliance on foreign funding and paid employees, lack of philanthropy traditions and a 
paucity of sustainable Russian donors who could support HROs increased the vulnerability of 
this sector, and together with the “foreign agents” law implementation provoked additional 
damage to the institutions that were functioning within the sector. A massive resistance has 
been demonstrated de jure. In contrast,  self-absorption and self-discipline are recognized de 
facto which can been seen, for example, in the attempts by HROs to escape from the scope of 
the “foreign agents” law by securing vital funding without relying on any foreign sources for 
those monies.  
To summarize: this dissertation contributes to an ongoing interdisciplinary debate on nonprofit 
accountability by exploring the institutional field of human rights organizations, examining 
how financial reporting mechanisms are being employed to satisfy growing accountability 
demands, and studying how the distinct pressures from stakeholders and financial reporting and 
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accounting regulation, as well as specific social-national contexts, interact to shape 
accountability practices of HROs in recent years. The dissertation argues that the financial 
accountability of HROs is a complex context-specific phenomenon. Relying on a socio-
constructivist perception on accounting, this dissertation applies several innovative empirical 
and methodological approaches to nonprofit accounting and accountability research, including 
netnography, analysis of   Internet-based discussions of practitioners and the use of real-life 
constructs that are embedded in interview sessions. The dissertation follows the approach of 
Lukka & Vinnari (2014) which distinguishes between domain and method theories in research. 
It applies a triangulation of selected theories (including legitimacy, stakeholder, and resource 
dependence theories), as well as the analytical lenses of institutional logics for advancing 
research equipment. It also tests several theories in new empirical settings (for instance, the 
theory of attention on intra-organizational level in public-nonprofit interactions and non-liberal 
governmentality in the nonprofit sector) in order to enrich our knowledge of the phenomenon 
under consideration.  
Even though HROs’ resource dependence, specific interactions with stakeholders, and the 
socio-political environment influence the accountability of HROs, the dissertation claims that 
a desire to achieve and sustain organizational legitimacy is the main driver for HRO 
accountability. Evaluating financial reporting as a mechanism for the satisfaction of 
accountability demands, the dissertation demonstrates that constant financial outflows from the 
core missions in order to prepare financial reports that comply with existing accounting 
standards did not prompt stakeholders’ interest in these documents. Instead, supplementing 
accounting standard setters in this role, powerful stakeholders have created alternative reporting 
systems using their own patterns of governance, and this has increased HROs workload on 
reporting issues. Exercising a great deal of influence over the setting in which HROs operate, 
by demanding not only financial accounting, but also management accounting information, 
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donors  interfere significantly with the operationalization of  HROs—challenging  their very 
independence of their missions and affecting the practical aspects of their working agendas. 
Establishing a bridge between prior research on nonprofit accountability and user-need research 
in nonprofit accounting, this dissertation extends views on the reasoning behind and the impact 
of donors’ demands on the financial reporting mechanisms that seek their satisfaction.  The 
present study advances an argument for creating a specialized accounting framework in the 
nonprofit sector and for considering institutional donors as the ideal user-group in development 
of such a framework. Finally, the dissertation shows that in certain socio-political settings, shifts 
in power from donors to the state regulator  demonstrates a significant recent effort to mobilize 
financial reporting and accounting requirements for disciplining, changing and shaping the 
institutional field of human rights activism and HRO accountability.  
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Abstract 
Human rights organizations (HROs) operate in a context of increasing demand for transparency 
and accountability and seeking better control of donated financial resources. HROs differ from 
business enterprises and other types of nonprofit organizations (NPOs), but little research has 
been conducted on the accountability of HROs. This paper contributes to an understanding of 
HROs’ financial accountability by providing hermeneutic netnographic study on the main 
concerns of HRO’s professional community. The study finds that HROs face the highest 
accountability requirements among NPOs. The main concerns of HROs’ professionals are 
determined by financial vulnerability, resource dependence, lack of legitimacy and high level 
of public scrutiny. The paper advances a significant argument for the development of nonprofit 
financial accounting framework.  
 
Keywords: human rights organizations; financial accountability; nonprofit accounting; 
Internet-based nonprofit community; netnography. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous global issues create environments for human rights violations in many forms and 
diverse contexts. Civil societies respond by increasing the power of human rights organizations 
(HROs) (Cingranelli & Richards, 2001). HROs are nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that are 
independent from governments, political ideologies, economic interests and religions. They 
focus on defending human rights and preventing human rights abuses (Gaer, 1995; ICHRP, 
2003; Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004; Davis, Murdie & Steinmetz, 2012). 
HROs differ from businesses in their missions, revenue acquisition (Monsen, 2010; Mitchell, 
2014), stakeholder interactions (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008) and performance evaluations 
(Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2012; Mook & Handy, 2010; Cordes &Coventry, 2010). Various 
types of financial contributions are the main sources of support for NPOs (Khieng &Dahles, 
2015). International funds, institutional and private foundations provide the major resources for 
HROs. Donations function, in principle, to keep HROs independent as the organizations are 
controlled for the appropriate use of the donated funds through their financial reporting systems. 
Even though various stakeholders require different types and levels of accountability (Ebrahim, 
2003), there is, a general call for increasing financial transparency and accountability of all 
NPOs (McCarthy, 2007; Sloan, 2009; Saxton, Jenn-Shyong & Ho, 2012; Verbruggen, 
Christiaens & Milis, 2011; Schmitz, Raggo & Vijfeijken, 2012) and for new forms of financial 
reporting on their received donations (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Ryan, Mack, Tooley & Irvine, 
2014). 
The increasing demand for NPOs’ accountability “has not been accompanied by extensive 
academic examinations of the emergence of accountability in specific … [NPO] contexts” 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008, p. 819). Existing literature includes accountability studies of 
hospitals (Schlesinger, Mitchell & Gray, 2004), churches (Laughlin, 1990; McCarthy, 2007), 
charities (Gourdie & Rees, 2009; Knutsen & Brower, 2010), and cooperatives (Monsen, 2010), 
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but with the exception of some studies on Amnesty International (Candler, 2001; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008), little attention is given to the accountability of HROs. Even though many 
scholars advocate greater accountability, disclosure and transparency of NPOs (Sloan, 2009; 
Schmitz et al., 2012; Breen, 2013) through compliance with accounting standards (Verbruggen 
et al., 2011) and provision of clear financial information (Schlesinger et al., 2004; Saxton et al, 
2012), there has been little research that examine whether the existing accounting framework 
is relevant to nonprofit contexts (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Helmig, Jegers & Lapsley, 2004; 
Mook & Handy, 2010; Monsen, 2010; Ryan et al., 2014). 
This article contributes to an understanding of the main concerns on HROs’ financial 
accountability and accounting through an explorative study of the opinions of nonprofit 
practitioners. These are collected from discussions within Internet-based nonprofit professional 
groups. The study discusses NPOs in general, including situations where HROs are similar to 
other NPOs, and treats HROs’ differences from other NPOs wherever they occur. Interpretivist 
hermeneutic positions ground the study. 
Different theoretical frameworks are applied to explain the financial accountability of NPOs: 
agent theory (Laughlin, 1990), institutional theory (Helmig et al., 2004; Verbruggen et al., 
2011), resource dependence theory (Knutsen & Brower, 2010; Froelich, 1999; Khieng 
&Dahles, 2015), structuration theory (Helmig et al., 2004), legitimacy theory (Schlesinger et 
al., 2004; O’Sullivan & O’ Dwyer, 2009), and stakeholder theory (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; 
Saxton et al, 2012; Sinclair & Bolt, 2013). This paper applies theory triangulation. Financial 
accountability of HROs is analyzed in terms of their high degree of financial vulnerability and 
their resource dependence on institutional donors (Verbruggen et al., 2011; Gaer, 1995; Trussel, 
Greenlee & Brady, 2002; Mitchell, 2014), taking into consideration possible lack of legitimacy 
and recent marks of the public scrutiny of NPO’s performance (Schlesinger et al., 2004; 
O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009; Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; Bothwell, 2004).  
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The article has the following structure. The next section discusses the main characteristics of   
HROs. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework for studying financial accountability of 
HROs. Section 4 describes the research design, focusing on methodology, data characteristics, 
data collection, and fulfilment of ethical standards. Section 5 presents the findings of empirical 
study. The final section discusses the implication of the findings and expresses some concluding 
remarks. 
 
1.2. HROs AND OTHER TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS  
The choice of accountability mechanisms depends on organizational type, structure, missions 
and activities (Gourdie & Rees, 2009; Williams & Taylor, 2013).  
Profit maximization is the core objective of businesses (Knutsen & Brower, 2010) which 
acquire revenues through market exchange transactions (see Figure 1.1). In contrast, NPOs are 
focused on service provision and do not have profit objectives (Gourdie & Rees, 2009). They 
acquire revenues though one-way money transactions (donations) without providing a direct 
return to their donors, and use budgets for the allocation of the donations to cover expenditures 
(Anheier, 2014; Monsen, 2010). Thus, they can be called budget-linked organizations 
(Danielsson, 1977). The efficiency of nonprofits cannot be solely determined by the information 
in financial statements (Cordes &Coventry, 2010; Morgan & Fletcher, 2013); their revenue 
does not indicate the demand for services or performance. From an accountability perspective, 
budgetary-linked organizations differ significantly from market-linked organizations (Trussel, 
2003; Monsen, 2010; Ryan et al., 2014; Williams & Taylor, 2013), and business accountability 
mechanisms may not apply to NPOs (Gourdie & Rees, 2009).  
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Figure 1.1: Profit and nonprofit organisations 
 
Much organizational and functional diversity exists within the nonprofit world (Anheier, 2014). 
In the existing literature terms like “nonprofit organizations,” “nongovernmental organizations” 
(NGOs), “civil society organizations,” “voluntary organizations,” and “social profit 
organizations”  as well as “charity” are commonly used as synonyms (ICHRP, 2003; Anheier, 
2014). Schlesinger et al. (2004) and Anheier (2014) emphasize the risk of confusion and 
unclearness, since each of the preceding terms portrays only one characteristic of the nature and 
features of NPOs.  
Even though there have been many attempts to define nonprofit organizations, a single precise 
definition has not yet appeared (Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006). Most frequently, NPOs are given 
a negative type of definition by clarifying and listing what NPOs are not (ICHRP, 2003; Gray, 
Bebbington & Collison, 2006; Schlesinger et al., 2004): 
NGOs are organizations which are neither governmental (public sector) 
organizations …, nor private (for-profit) commercial organizations (Unerman & 
O'Dwyer, 2006, p. 307).  
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For the purposes of this paper, the term “nonprofit organizations” has been chosen in order to 
emphasize that NPOs, in contrast to business organizations, do not have a profit objective. As 
the paper refers to the research of other scholars, it will make use of these other terms, as well. 
Different types of NPOs face a variety of accountability requirements (McCarthy, 2007; 
Gourdie & Rees, 2009). According to Cousins’ widely used classification (1991), four types of 
orientation represent NPOs: charitable, service, participatory, and empowering (see Figure 1.2).  
  
Figure 1.2: HROs in organizational classification 
Source: adopted from Cousins (1991); visualized by the author 
 
The UN in its Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts (2003) 
uses the nine-group NPO classification adapted from Salamon et al. (1999; see also Vakil, 
1997). In these classifications, HROs belong to the empowering advocacy group. Tsutsui & 
Wotipka (2004) note the increase of the number of international HROs from 30 in 1970s to 412 
in 1998. HROs themselves declare their purposes as: “monitoring and reporting of government 
[and private sector] behavior on human rights, particularly violations, building pressure and 
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creating international machinery to end the violations and to hold governments [and businesses] 
accountable” (Gaer, 1995, p. 394). HROs commonly use several tactics for achieving their 
purposes: to uncover the abuses of rights by using investigations and independent monitoring, 
“shaming and naming,” and making use of campaign strategies (Bonner, 2005; Davis et al., 
2012; NHC, 2012), communications with decision-makers and expert advice (Gaer, 1995; 
ICHRP, 2003 Davis et al., 2012). They also provide services (legal support, education) and 
support democracy (NHC, 2012). Within transnational advocacy networks (Davis et al., 2012), 
many HROs have obtained official consultative status in international institutions (Tsutsui & 
Wotipka, 2004) and are often called “watchdogs” of governments, politicians and businesses.  
Currently, the rights-based approach (RBA) has been chosen as a principal background for 
integrating human rights principles into measures of global change (Hansen & Sano, 2006). 
RBA claims that all people are “rights holders”, and therefore “duty bearers” are indebted to 
protect their rights. RBA implementation increases demand for accountability not only for state 
authorities, but also for non-state actors (Hansen & Sano, 2006).  
 
1.3. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF HROs 
Accountability is a complex “chameleon-like” concept (Mulgan, 2000; Candler, 2001; Bovens, 
2007). It acquires multiple definitions (Williams & Taylor, 2013) and classifications (Laughlin, 
1990; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). This paper adopts Bovens’ definition (2007):  
Accountability is … a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which 
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face 
consequences (p. 447).  
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Based on the nature of the conduct, Bovens (2007) classifies financial, procedural and product 
accountabilities. Keating & Frumkin (2003) define financial accountability through “fiscal 
honesty and avoidance of fraud” (p. 4). 
Because acquisition of revenues is crucial for avoiding bankruptcy (Trussel et al., 2002; 
Anheier, 2014; Monsen, 2010), from an accounting perspective financial accountability is the 
most important form of NPOs’ accountability. NPOs’ claim of financial accountability sends a 
positive signal to donors, builds trust and minimizes the risk in financial relationships; this has 
strong reputational effect (Offenheiser & Holcombe, 2003; Saxton et al., 2012). 
Given the complexity of the topic, this study applies multiple theoretical lenses (theory 
triangulation) (Denzin, 1978). Resource dependence and legitimacy theories are applied, to 
answer why HROs need to be financially accountable (Froelich, 1999; Khieng &Dahles, 2015; 
ICHRP, 2003). Stakeholder theory assists in the mapping of actors to whom HROs are 
accountable (Rupp, Kern & Helmig, 2014); general accounting principles and consideration of 
organizational context (Laughlin, 1990) frame knowledge on HROs’ accountability 
mechanisms. These lenses supplement one another to achieve a coherent and comprehensive 
understanding of phenomenon (Modell, 2009; Berg & Line, 2012; Hopper & Hoque, 2006).  
 
1.3.1. Resource dependence and financial vulnerability 
The resource dependence theory postulates that the ability of an organization to accumulate and 
maintain resources is crucial for its survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). All NPOs, including 
HROs, are highly dependent on external foundation (Verbruggen et al., 2011; Khieng &Dahles, 
2015). NPOs face tough fundraising competition (Mitchell, 2014) which demands greater 
financial accountability. This mandates that NPOs be judged (Cordes & Coventry, 2010; 
Reheul, Van Caneghem & Verbruggen, 2014) on whether their performance meets public 
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expectations (Helmig et al., 2004). NPOs use various sources of revenue: individual and 
corporate donations, grants from foundations, governmental transfers, grants and contracts, as 
well as commercial activities (selling goods or charging service fees) (Froelich, 1999; Anheier, 
2014). 
In contrast with other NPOs which can accept governmental foundations, many HROs try to 
stay financially independent from governments and powerful groups (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008; Gaer, 1995). HROs usually do not carry out commercial activities to gain revenues. 
Finally, even though some of HROs attract volunteer labor, they typically rely on paid 
employees. Normally, funding for the concrete projects of HROs comes from independent 
foundations, including the European Commission and United Nations, the Ford Foundation, 
NED, MacArthur Foundation, and Open Society Foundations.  
Resource dependence makes organizations vulnerable to resource flows and institutional 
pressures (Verbruggen et al., 2011; Khieng &Dahles, 2015). Saidel (1991) classifies three 
resource dependence criteria: the importance of the resource, availability of alternatives, and 
ability to compel provision of the resource. By applying a measurement of financial 
vulnerability, Trussel et al. (2002) claim: “[NPOs] with fewer revenue sources are more 
vulnerable to financial shock than those with multiple revenue sources” (p. 67).  
The fact that HROs must limit their revenue sources makes them more financially vulnerable 
than other NPOs. As a result, HROs are the type of NPOs, which face the most substantial 
requirements of financial accountability.  
 
1.3.2. Lack of legitimacy. Accounting and performance measurement  
The legitimacy crisis is another reason of the increasing demand for the financial accountability 
of nonprofits, including HROs (ICHRP, 2003; Schlesinger et al., 2004; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 
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2009). Many financial scandals have had an impact on the nonprofit sector (Gibelman & 
Gelman, 2001; Bothwell, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011). Consider as examples the scandals of the 
Bishop Estate, Feed the Children, Women’s Royal Voluntary Service, Bavarian Red Cross, 
Foundation for Peace and Justice. The employees and management of these NPOs committed 
fraud, falsifications, theft, misuse of funds, embezzlement, tax evasion, and face criminal 
allegations (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; Trussel, 2003; Krishnan, Yetman & Yetman, 2006; 
Trivunovic, 2011). The most remarkable HRO financial scandal is the case of International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, which filed for bankruptcy and consequently closed 
down due to massive fraud, economic crime and embezzlement of €1.2 million by its financial 
manager (Trivunovic, 2011).  
The International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) (2003) claims that “[HROs’] 
success, even survival, depends significantly on their ability … to demonstrate that they respect 
their own values. Challenges come … from those they criticize … the media, and 
…independent observers in government” (p. 49). These challenges are determined by two 
factors. Firstly, after RBA was introduced, HROs were the first type of organizations from 
whom the public expected RBA’s implementation (Offenheiser & Holcombe, 2003; O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2008). Secondly, the “naming and shaming” strategy that HROs apply to human 
rights violators might well be turned against their own organizations and challenge their own 
legitimacy (Schmitz et al., 2012). 
Truthfulness in financial reporting is one of the cornerstones of the legitimacy of NPOs 
(Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Schlesinger et al., 2004; Saxton et al, 2012). Nevertheless, it is not 
obvious whether current financial statements satisfy users’ demands (Mook & Handy, 2010; 
Monsen, 2010; Breen, 2013; Ryan et al., 2014). Today, profitability accounts are the dominant 
framework for extending a profit-oriented approach to NPOs. Several researchers claim that 
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NPOs diverge from businesses and thus need a distinctive accounting framework (Keating & 
Frumkin, 2003; Monsen, 2010; Ryan et al., 2014).  
Another crucial component of NPOs’ accountability is the demonstration of mission-based 
performance (Saxton et al, 2012). It is not obvious which performance indicators that NPOs 
should employ (Barman, 2007; Hall, 2014). Van der Heijden (2012) suggests using a statement 
of functional expense which splits NPO’s expenses into three groups: program, administrative 
and fundraising. Independent monitoring bodies usually set a threshold of 25% for effective 
NPOs’ administrative and fundraising expenses (CN, 2013). These thresholds can, however, 
motivate NPOs to manipulate their accounting numbers (Trussel, 2003; Offenheiser & 
Holcombe, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). Krishnan et al. (2006) provide evidence that 
more than 50 percent of all US NPOs report zero fundraising expenses. ICHRP (2003) includes 
public recognition, trust and support, media coverage and achievement of specific targets 
among the alternative criteria of HROs’ effectiveness. These criteria, however, cannot always 
be quantified.  
Performance measurement and financial reporting are important components of the legitimacy 
of HROs, when “voluntary disclosure of pertinent financial and performance related 
information [makes] … organizations …able to signal their efficiency, effectiveness, 
credibility, responsiveness, … accountability” (Saxton et al, 2012, p. 1066; see also McCarthy, 
2007; Breen, 2013) and may help them to attract new providers of financial and labor resources 
(Keating & Frumkin, 2003).  
 
1.3.3. Stakeholder perspective 
To identify those to whom HROs are accountable the stakeholder approach is applied (ICHRP, 
2003; Keating & Frumkin, 2003). The fact that NPOs (including HROs) do not have specific 
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owners or any shareholders (Knutsen & Brower, 2010) makes them accountable to an unlimited 
number of widely defined stakeholders (Niskala &Näsi, 1995).  The stakeholder of an HRO is 
“everyone who may be affected by a project or piece of work, or have an interest in its outcome” 
(ICHRP 2003, p. 61).  
HRO stakeholders can be classified into four  groups: recipients/beneficiaries, internal 
stakeholders (founders, board, managers, employees), financial supporters (donors, sponsors) 
and external stakeholders with control, monitoring and cooperation functions (governments, 
partners, international monitoring bodies, international institutions, community). Particular 
stakeholders may belong to several of these groups. For example, international institutions, 
governments and partners could also provide financial support; a given community could be a 
beneficier and a monitoring stakeholder at the same time (see Figure 1.3).   
 
 
Figure 1.3: Stakeholder map for HROs 
Source: adopted from Näsi (1995), ICHRP (2003); modified by the author 
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Due to its technical and conceptual complexity, financial accounting information is 
understandable only to those users who have appropriate professional education and experience 
(Keating & Frumkin, 2003). Accordingly, donors, sponsors, partners, government and 
independent monitoring groups are the most likely stakeholders who demand financial 
accountability (Krishnan et al.,2006; Sloan, 2009; Sinclair & Bolt, 2013).  
The main beneficiaries of the services of HROs services are the core mission group of HROs. 
Simply stated: they can avail themselves of the free legal, mental and financial support provided 
by HROs (ICHRP, 2003).  
Donors are the most salient stakeholders when it comes to financial accountability (Assad & 
Goddard, 2010). Keating & Frumkin (2003), ICHRP (2003), O’Dwyer & Unerman (2008) 
defined two groups of donors according to accountability demand. The first group can be called 
“unprofessional” (mostly private) donors, who are inspired by the mission and the reputation 
of HROs and are mostly driven by emotions and intuition. The second group of donors, 
foundations and grant providers, express high levels of concern about HROs’ financial issues 
(Verbruggen et al., 2011; Saxton et al, 2012); sometimes these donors demand special financial 
control and reporting (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; ICHRP, 2003; Gourdie & Rees, 2009) and 
even arrange financial inspections (Assad & Goddard, 2010).   
International institutions can function as financial providers, but most importantly create the 
arenas where HROs could play semi-official roles, share the results of their investigations and 
affect decision-making processes (Matlary, 2002). 
Independent monitoring bodies are intermediary agents between donors and NPOs. They 
provide information about financial health, accountability, transparency and performance of 
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NPOs and advise donors on how to choose reliable NPOs. Krishnan et al. (2006) and Sloan 
(2009) claim that positive ratings of NPOs increase donor contributions.  
On the national level, HROs deal with legislative and executive agents: parliaments and 
governments. As has been mentioned, HROs try to avoid political or financial affiliations with 
governments (Gaer, 1995; ICHRP, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008), especially in 
developing and transitional countries. Even functionally independent HROs are obliged to 
report on their activities to government authorities.  
To summarize, due to the dominance of institutional foundations among HROs’ supporters, 
relationships with them should be built on trust and long-term perspectives. HRO stakeholders 
achieve power to affect reporting systems of HROs and to monitor their financial accountability 
on a constant and close basis. The financial vulnerability and resource dependence from 
powerful stakeholders, the legitimacy crisis and public scrutiny, together with imperfections in 
the accounting framework and lack of clarity in performance measurement determine demand 
for the financial accountability of HROs.  
 
1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN  
HROs have significant reasons to demonstrate their accountability and legitimacy. There are, 
however, controversial views on appropriate accounting and performance measurement 
systems. Understanding accounting as institutional practice and considering the role of 
professional groups in institutional change (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002), this paper 
examines these issues by “giving the floor” to nonprofit practitioners. 
In order to establish the necessary insights into the nonprofit community (mainly, HROs), to 
get a sufficient overview of the main concerns they face and test the chosen theories, an 
exploratory study approach is applied (Yin, 2003). The exploratory study of Internet-based 
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professional discussions gives opportunity to examine rich and massive datasets with a tentative 
preliminary agenda. The ethnographic method enables a close examination of everyday practice 
of subjects while observing their daily behavior and assessing their interpretations of accounting 
use (Grey, 1998; Dey, 2001). Ethnographic research based on Internet data is called 
netnography (Kozinets, 2010). 
The research uses netnographic analysis, supplemented by elements of stakeholder analysis and 
visual mapping. The nonprofit community is construed as an ethnographic group that shares 
common knowledge and culture. In contrast with other qualitative methods, in this case 
netnography provides an opportunity to observe large number of practitioners around the world 
while they engage in discussions based on their own interests. It also enables to avoid 
respondents’ misreporting (Lee & Woodliffe, 2010) and the effect of the interviewer on their 
opinions (Hammersley &Atkinson, 2007; see also Kozinets, 2010 for the quality criteria of 
netnographic research). 
The author is not aware of the total population of NPO discussion groups on the Internet; 
therefore, the study does not aim to generalize over the population, but to provide scientific 
propositions about the studied phenomenon (Kozinets, 2010). The research relies on the 
principles of theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hammersley &Atkinson, 2007), 
which means choosing the samples in which the research interest is “transparently observable” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The groups which have been studied are located on a single professional networking platform. 
The author performed the preliminary screening of available nonprofit community groups. Two 
types of groups were identified: “open” (the discussions are fully seen, shared and discovered 
on the Web) and “closed” (the content is visible to the membership). All groups are dynamic 
organisms, which frequently change their status. In addition, most popular discussions circulate 
within different groups. Therefore, even though the author “lurked” on more than ten different 
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groups, the final dataset includes data from five publicly accessible groups: Mango Worldwide 
(MNG), Governmental - Not-for-Profit Accounting and Auditing Issues (GNPAAI), Nonprofit 
Accounting & Grant Management (NPA&GM), Charity UK(C_UK), and UK 
Fundraising(F_UK). These groups are active (“alive”) on a daily basis (as of October 2012).  
An independent discussion is chosen as one sampling unit. The discussion is defined as a single 
conversation (“thread”) on a topic. Since systematic sampling is neither possible in 
netnographic research, nor desirable within the purposes of this explorative study, theoretical 
sampling was applied (Hammersley &Atkinson, 2007). The author performed the screening of 
available discussions based on their relevance to the context of HROs. The author targeted and 
selected only the discussions directly related to accountability and accounting issues.  
The final database includes120 samples. All available discussions were collected from the dates 
of the groups’ creation (or opening for public) until the October 2012. The author observed the 
discussions within a five-month period; however, the opportunity to read archival data 
permitted the inclusion in the dataset of discussions that took place over several years (see 
Table1.1 in Appendix 1.1). The dataset consists of the discussions of accounting, management 
and consultant professionals employed by different NPOs (without the specific extraction of 
HRO employees). Such an extraction would have damage the nature of the observed 
discussions, since HRO professionals do not exclude themselves from the Internet-based 
nonprofit communities, and according to the author’s best knowledge, the discussions within 
special HRO accounting and fundraising groups do not exist. In order to preserve the 
authenticity of the discussions and research neutrality, the author did not engage with the 
studied community. 
Dean, Eichorn & Dean (1967) specified that ethnographers typically aim for the involvement 
of two types of informants:  “informants who are especially sensitive to the area of concern and 
the more-willing-to-reveal informants” (p. 285). In this specific study, the author identified both 
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types of informants within the studied discussion groups. The first type of informant includes 
the members who create the discussions based on their own concerns and information needs; 
the second type of informant contributes the most by commenting on the issues under 
discussion.  
After selecting the practitioners’ quotes and comments that were deemed most relevant for the 
research focus, the following distribution can be shown:  
- total number of contributing participants – 40 (100%);  
- employed by HROs and other advocacy NPOs – 14 (35%);  
- accountants and fundraisers, working in accounting and consulting firms for all types of NPOs 
– 13 (32, 5%); 
- employed by charities – 4 (10%); 
- employed by religious NPOs – 4 (10%) (see Table 1.1 in Appendix 1.1). 
The examination demonstrates that financial accountability is a very interesting topic for HRO 
practitioners. Accordingly, the research findings are accepted as relevant to HROs. In order to 
focus on HROs, the author paid special attention to the comments of HRO practitioners and 
based the development of the research findings on these particular comments. 
Seeking a reasonable confidence in the professional levels of participants, the author traced the 
personal information which they provided on the networking platform (names, positions, CVs) 
and compared this data with the information available on the sites of their employers. Because 
practitioners use the platform for professional communication, the author found that the 
information they provide is factually accurate. 
All data samples were analyzed manually. Texts of particular discussions were interpreted from 
the positions of critical and alternate templates research perspectives through the identification 
of patterns and the finding of distinctive meanings in patterns (Belk, Fischer & Kozinets, 2013; 
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Lukka & Modell, 2010). For data interpretation and structuration, the hermeneutic approach is 
used instead of analytical coding and content analysis. The participants (Kozinets, 2010) 
because the main attention is given to the meanings shaped in the interaction (Lukka& Modell, 
2010) rather than to the forms of expression or the word choices make this. 
Seeking hermeneutic interpretations is presumed to be “coherent and free of contradiction… 
comprehensible to the reading audience …supported with relevant examples… enlightening 
[and] fruitful in revealing new dimensions of the problem at hand” (Arnold & Fischer, 1994, p. 
64). In netnographic interpretive research, such interpretations represent an equivalent of 
internal validity as this is understood in positivist epistemology (Kozinets, 2010). The 
interpretive approach identifies two components of qualitative research validity: authenticity 
and plausibility (Lukka & Modell, 2010). This study attempts to achieve a high level of 
authenticity by analyzing naturally constructed and publicly traceable professional discussions 
(Kozinets, 2010). Plausibility of explanations is achieved by presenting multiple and 
contrasting explanations of the financial accountability of HROs, in particular by applying 
theory triangulation (Berg & Lune, 2012), several rounds of analysis (Kozinets, 2010), elements 
of respondents’ validation (Hammersley &Atkinson, 2007) and giving voice to the ‘Others’ 
(Lukka & Modell, 2010). 
The author uses the element of content analysis (the Word cloud) only once (subsection 4.2.2) 
as a supplement to the main approach, to demonstrate the exaggerated focus that NPOs place 
on their donors. The Word cloud is created by incorporation of all the textual data into the 
Wordle program. The cloud shows the frequency of each term by the size of the word. Together 
with the distribution of participants as already shown, these are the only two episodes where 
the analysis appropriates the quantitative characteristics of data. In this way, the study only 
applies an analytical theoretical generalization and not an enumerative statistical generalization 
(Yin, 2003). 
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Even though it is not obvious if online communities are public or private spaces (Kozinets, 
2010), the study applies high ethical standards of research. All selected groups are open. Allen, 
Burk & Davis (2006) claim that in such situation “manual, non-automated access of information 
on publicly available web pages should be acceptable without special permission” (p. 607). Yet 
because the practitioners are the authors of their own statements, the author of this paper 
collected written permissions, which allows direct quotations. The group members, who 
approve the direct quotations, prefer to be quoted with their real names. This signals that the 
collected dataset is a reliable source of information and contains within itself the element of 
respondents’ validation (Hammersley &Atkinson, 2007). 
 
1.5. ANALYSIS 
1.5.1. An overview: community characteristics and the main issues of concern 
The Internet nonprofit community appears to look professional, reasonable, and reliable, with 
a “knowledge entry fee”; that is, the group members need to have sufficient knowledge, 
education and experience to discuss specific nonprofit accounting and accountability issues. 
The group participants demonstrate low emotional level, use professional terms and discuss 
professional subjects. The group members identify themselves as professionals who can benefit 
from the discussions. The content shows that the participants consider the groups as suitable 
places for discussing the everyday problems and challenges of NPOs operationalization, 
seeking advice and planning fundraising events.   
The main issues of concern for each group are listed in Table 1.1 (Appendix 1.1) and are 
allocated within chosen multiple theoretical lenses for all the groups combined in Figure 1.4. 
The findings demonstrate that managers, accountants and fundraisers are concerned about 
different issues. The financial and project management of NPOs in developing countries 
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struggle with briberies and corruption (MNG group); entrepreneurs, consultants and fundraisers 
(UK_F and C_UK groups) are mainly focused on fundraising strategies and donor relationships; 
accountants from NPA&GM and GNPAAI groups focus on accounting, reporting and control 
issues. 
 
Figure 1.4: The determinants of the main issues of concern of nonprofit practitioners   
 
The nonprofit professional community has a mix of heterogeneity and homogeneity. From one 
side, different groups of stakeholders have various issues of concern and demand different types 
of NPO information. From another side, the stakeholders of different NPOs who belong to the 
same type of the stakeholder group (employees, donors, monitoring bodies) have mostly similar 
interests and concerns with one another. HRO practitioners (stakeholders) do not separate 
themselves from the rest of the nonprofit community in the discussions that they find relevant 
to themselves.  
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1.5.2. Resource dependence, fundraising and relationships with stakeholders 
Even though HROs are accountable to multiple stakeholders, based on the examined Internet 
discussions, major attention and priority is given to donors. Figure 1.5 (a “word cloud” or a 
“weighted list”) demonstrates this.  
 
Figure 1.5: A word cloud (a visual representation of the dataset)  
 
The figure shows clearly that nonprofit practitioners discuss donors and relationships with 
donors much more frequently than other issues (the appearance of word “donor(s)” is highest 
(17%) among all concepts mentioned in the dataset). C_UK and UK_F group participants assert 
the importance of donations for sustainable operationalization. The major source of funding 
determines the type of fundraising strategy. Various fundraising issues and the ways of 
attracting and keeping donors are central to many discussions. The nonprofit fundraisers believe 
that implementation of different motivational techniques in relation to the attraction of 
individual donors is more effective than the demonstration of financial performance. 
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Giles, a fundraising consultant, UK, GNPAAI group states:  
You need to present the need in a way that is emotive and compelling. Then 
you can argue that your organization has the solution, and needs money to 
implement it. 
  
In contrast, organizations financed by the institutional funds (most HROs belong to this group), 
focus on other principles in donor relationships. For example, MNG group members discuss 
the best approaches for preparing grant applications, where an emotional component is not 
important and formal criteria are used. 
Fi, a program manager in an empowering NPO, UK, MNG group asserts:  
I'm trying to develop a tool to help organizations decide whether or not to bid 
for different grants? … Questions I have so far are ‘Is this proposal in line with 
existing organizational strategies? …Does this proposal add significant … added 
value to the existing strategies which make it worth considering? …Is the donor 
of longer-term strategic interest?  
 
This situation is typical for HROs, especially in Europe, where the level of private donations to 
HROs is lower than in the USA.  
Some of the members of nonprofit groups realize the danger of a too strong focus on donor 
relationships and fundraising (“when money becomes not a tool, but a symbol”) that pulls NPOs 
too far from their original missions. In contrast, the author of this study was able to find only a 
few comments that were focused on interests of beneficiary groups and downward 
accountability.   
 
1.5.3. Legitimacy, organizational authenticity and performance measurement 
The data analysis demonstrates that extremely tough fundraising competition forces nonprofit 
managers to use business approaches and terminology (such as “NGO competition,” ‘‘donor 
markets,” and ‘‘branding”). For example, the CEO of an empowering NPO claims that his 
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colleagues need to think “like business persons” and consider donors’ financial support as 
investments. By adopting a business philosophy, NPOs are caught within the trap of the 
demands of constant growth. Several participants, including an HRO’s senior development 
executive, claimed that in order to keep their NPOs growing, they use business valuation terms 
and indexes, such as return on investment (ROI), SWOT-analysis in planning fundraising, and 
surplus revenues use for “reinvestment” for building “revenue generating capacity.”  
Kevin, fundraising professional in a religious NPO, USA, GNPAAI group:  
Fundraising planning should always include the numbers that an NPO/NGO is 
willing to invest in generating income, and projected ROI. 
 
In contrast, when the business approach contradicts the original ethic and mission of NPOs, the 
participants focus on the nature and fundamental principles of nonprofits.  
Robin, a director of development in empowering and religious NPOs, USA, NPA&GM group 
states: 
Charitable purpose is the most important thing. We do not want even place our 
organizations in compromising our missions, damaging donor trust or 
promoting self-interest over the common good. 
 
This is observable in the discussion of weather to base the fundraiser’s compensation based 
according to results. Even though some participants accept this as an effective way to motivate 
fundraisers, they claim that it can destroy the original nature of nonprofits, where supporters 
donate for the achievement of the NPO’s mission and not because of the specific fundraiser. 
Giles, a fundraising consultant, UK, UK_F group, asserts:   
I think payment on commission is just wrong. … Supposing someone gave 
£1m, they would be furious that a percentage was going to the fundraiser, as 
should the charity. 
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Other discussants (the director of development in a children-empowering NPO and the donor 
relations’ manager in an HRO) claim that compensation for fundraising based on results is 
against the charitable purpose of NPOs to serve the public and can damage donor trust. 
Contrasting with the business approach to fundraising, discussants from NPOs (HROs) do not 
want to be judged based on a business-oriented performance measurement. The participants are 
not supportive of the idea of using quantitative indicators for performance measurement, since 
it is not always possible to define program and administrative expenses fairly and financial 
indices do not really correspond to nonprofit specifics.  
Giles, a fundraising consultant, UK, UK_F group, states:  
People often confuse ' donors' with 'the general public'. … In my experience, 
donors are quite happy with the truth. The non-donors are the ones who create 
the impression that charities spend too much on admin, and this is picked up 
by the media. Charities then get defensive, and try to hide the costs. … 
Charities don't need to lie. They should write their Annual Report and 
Accounts for the investors (donors). 
 
To support this claim several consultants of HROs argue that the large NPOs are responsible 
for setting performance standards, based on program/administrative expenses thresholds, which 
they are not capable of meeting themselves. Such organizations justify fundraising expenses by 
calling them “education” (for example, when HROs provide human rights information on their 
fundraising flyers) and thus create pressure on other NPOs to show a reduction of administrative 
costs.  
In addition, young philanthropists with business background demand clear performance 
indicators (as in businesses) from HROs. 
Giles, a fundraising consultant, UK, C_UK group, states:  
Pre baby-boomers (civics) were happy to give to charity, and trusted them to 
help the needy. Baby boomers … demand much more ... They want permanent 
change, not helping the needy. And they want outcomes. 
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In this context, fundraising competition and efficiency demand determine a necessity to hire 
fundraisers and consultants to attract sustainable funding. This leads to resource outflows from 
the original missions of HROs and other NPOs. 
The observed discussions are quite controversial when it comes to debating the level of 
transparency and disclosure that HROs and other NPOs should provide. Some participants, 
including the marketing director and program officer of one of the biggest US HROs, value 
transparency as the core fundament for building trusting relationships with donors. Others argue 
that it is sufficient for donors to know that their funding is supporting core NPO’s aims, since 
management knows better than the donors about how to achieve the main goals and basic 
missions of the particular NPO. 
Concluding with respect to increasing accountability demand, nonprofit professionals 
understand that donors are interested in whether NPOs (HROs) achieve external outcomes by 
using donations, but they prefer that donors be focused on qualitative measures of performance 
and provide the professionals with freedom in relation to decisions disclosure. In addition, there 
is dissonance between using business approaches in fundraising planning and some tendencies 
to reject business criteria of performance evaluation. 
 
1.5.4. Demonstration of financial accountability and accounting challenges 
A certain amount of participants’ attention is given to accounting issues and challenges of 
accountability which NPOs (including HROs) face. Since the majority of accounting group 
participants is from the U.S., the major accounting framework that is considered is US GAAP.  
Despite this, most of the findings are generally applicable to NPOs operating within other 
accounting frameworks, since nonprofit accounting develops mostly in convergence with 
business accounting standards around the world (Monsen, 2010; Ryan et al., 2014). Moreover, 
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analogous accounting challenges appear in all types of NPOs (including HROs) since all of 
them must apply similar accounting standards within their particular jurisdictions. According 
to analysis, accountants of nonprofits face their main challenges due to duality, complexity and 
the existence of different meanings in the interpretation of revenue recognition, costs allocation, 
and reporting. Often these challenges and problems of reporting transactions take place because 
the standards of nonprofit accounting originate as a part of the history of standards setting for 
profit-oriented businesses. 
Based on the findings, the following accounting challenges take place: 
 In certain cases, it is unclear if grants should be recognized as contributions/donations (i.e., 
revenue) or as a service contract/exchange transaction (i.e., liability). Grant conditions also 
affect the period of revenue recognition (for example, if the grant is given for more than a year). 
 Many accounting software programs are oriented to business types of transactions and 
accept payments only against invoices. The accountants of NPOs need to be creative in order 
to record their transactions according to existing standards, while at the same time making sense 
of the distinctive nature of NPO activities.  
 Another reason for the accounting complexity is the necessity to use accrual and cash 
methods in different situations: income and expenses need to be recorded on an accrual basis, 
but reimbursement for grants is received on a cash basis. 
 In order to get meaningful reports, NPOs need to recognize donors as customers and their 
contributions as sales receipt or invoices within the existent accounting system. 
Sandi, a director of administration at a religious NPO, USA, NPA&GM group, asks: 
How are you entering the donations? Are you entering them as a sales receipt 
or invoices or just connecting them with the donor's name on the deposit 
screen? 
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The suggested approach is incorrect, since the donor is not an equivalent to the customer of the 
business organization and is not a beneficiary of NPO activities.   
 The members of accounting groups regularly criticize the misunderstandings that NPO 
financial reporting forms can create. For example, the participants discuss the reporting form, 
IRS Form 990, used in USA for charities that accept tax-deductible donations. In this form, the 
reporting of charitable contribution of fundraising events creates the illusion of loss on events, 
since “the character of the proceeds collected at the event is differentiated between… the market 
value of the event expenses and charitable contributions.” This gives the false impression that 
the success of fundraising depends on the ability to minimize the event costs, rather than on the 
willingness of donors to support the organization.  
 The participants in these discussions show doubts that financial reports in their existing 
form can be an effective tool for attracting donors:  
Sara, an owner of an accounting services bureau, USA, GNPAAI group asserts: “Donors need 
to be able to … trust the figures. We are still very far away from this goal.” 
Christine, a CPA in an HRO, USA, NPA&GM group remarks:  
I have heard some express doubt that funders actually look at the 990, much less 
use it as an informational tool for assessing a nonprofit's performance.  
 
 Participants claim that the complexity of accounting standards has a negative effect on the 
quality of financial reporting, and, therefore, on the transparency and accountability of small 
NPOs that cannot afford permanently employed accountants. They demand “easier” reporting 
forms for nonprofits. 
To conclude, even though accountants seem to be more oriented to solving everyday accounting 
problems than to the strategic improvement of nonprofit accounting standards, the low level of 
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satisfaction with existing accounting standards, along with significant demand for an 
accounting system which is authentic to NPO activities and transactions, is clearly observed.  
 
1.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reveals the lack of attention to human rights organizations in third sector research 
and seeks to contribute to an understanding of HROs financial accountability. The study 
explores several angles on HRO financial accountability and accounting by applying multiple 
theoretical lenses and acquiring knowledge of the main concerns of professionals within the 
nonprofit community.  
Targeting diversity in the financial accountability of different types of NPOs, the research 
explores HROs within the larger community of NPOs. Practitioners of HROs (empowering and 
advocacy organizations) represent 35% of the active contributors to the Internet-based 
discussions on financial accountability, relationships with donors, fundraising, accounting and 
reporting challenges. Therefore, HROs have the largest representation in these discussions than 
compared to other types of NPOs. Since an enrolment in discussions is volunteer, this signals 
the strong concern of HRO professionals with accountability issues.   
Analytical lenses of resource dependence and legitimacy theories applied to the studied 
phenomena prompted the author to propose that HROs face the highest level of accountability 
requirements among NPOs. This is because of the scrupulous attention HROs must pay  to their 
methods of securing donations and sources, the nature of those sources of funding and high 
public expectations that HROs express their core values not only in their programs but also in 
their fundraising and accountability strategies. The empirical study recognizes an exaggerated 
focus on the part of HRO professionals on relationships with donors, which indicates the strong 
resource dependence of these organizations. Applying three theoretical lenses simultaneously 
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to the empirical findings, the research claims that even though these concerns have multiple 
reasons, seeking legitimacy is the main driver of HROs financial accountability (see Figure1.4). 
The study confirms earlier research findings (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008; Rupp et al., 2014) about the existence of several groups of donors, with low and high 
accountability demand respectively. NPO (including HRO) fundraisers treat these groups in 
different ways: private donors are attracted based on their emotional motives; by contrast, grant 
providers and financially astute private donors demand financial disclosure and performance 
evaluation. In addition, the participants of fundraising groups claim that the younger generation 
of donors is more demanding of accountability than is the older generation.  
The research recognizes duality in relationships between HROs and their donors. HROs 
demand financial support, but attempt to remain independent in decision-making. The 
accountability relationships depend not only on what donors want to know, but also on what 
NPOs are ready to tell them. In contrast to the prior research on downward accountability 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010), this study has not identified the 
NPOs/HROs interest to accountability relationships with other stakeholders than the donors and 
supports the concern of Wellens & Jegers (2014) on overrate of downward accountability.  
The study shows a linkage between the challenges and complexities in performance 
measurement and accounting and the difficulties for HROs to demonstrate legitimacy and 
accountability. Increasing fundraising competition forces nonprofit managers to use business 
approaches and terminology. Even when they apply business approaches to fundraising, NPOs 
do not support business-oriented performance measurements. They emphasize the 
imperfections of existing performance measurement systems which do not accurately represent 
the success or failure of any given NPO, but may force these organizations to manipulate their 
accounting data and create the necessity for them to hire professional fundraisers and 
consultants. This leads to resource outflows that may detract from the missions of the HRO. 
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Given this context, an exploration of the dissonance between approaches for fundraising 
planning and performance evaluation corresponds to disagreements on appropriate performance 
measurement systems in third sector that is revealed and discussed in the previous academic 
literature (Hall, 2014; Barman, 2007).  
With respect to the recent claims on the irrelevance of the business accounting framework for 
application in third sector (Ryan et al., 2014; Monsen, 2010; Mook & Handy, 2010), the paper 
advances a significant argument for the development of special accounting framework for 
nonprofit organizations. The study provides empirical evidence that the existing form of 
accounting for nonprofits has significant limitations and is burdened with complexity, duality 
and controversy, especially in cases of revenue recognition, costs allocation and reporting. 
These conditions have emerged because currently there is an inappropriate basis of the existent 
accounting system and an absence of clear definitions for key accounting concepts. In this 
context, accountants are forced to manipulative actions to accommodate NPO financial 
activities to accounting standards. Such pressures and practices decrease the value of the 
financial reports created in such environment. These findings support an observation of the 
International Accounting Standards Board, which reports that non-for-profit entities often have 
difficulties as they attempt to apply current accounting standards to their distinctive 
organizations and missions. Finally, the research recognizes a significant demand by 
practitioners for an accounting framework for NPOs based on a relevant accounting theory. 
Even though a national variety in Internet accounting groups is quite limited, the global 
operation of donors and NPOs, together with the similarities of philanthropic principles across 
nations and around the world, and an emerging movement towards the international unification 
of accounting principles make these findings applicable to different (inter)national context(s). 
In addition to the stated implications of this study, the paper provides an impulse to conduct 
explorative research in nonprofit sector using Internet-based data sources and online 
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communication (Tremblay-Boire & Prakash, 2015; Eimhjellen, Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2014). 
To advance such research, the paper introduces netnography as a method in nonprofit 
accounting research that allows to obtain knowledge about the practices, challenges and 
concerns of qualified accounting and fundraising practitioners around the world as these matters 
are communicated within the scope of naturally created professional discussions. This method 
minimizes the influence and potential bias of the researcher on the collected opinions (in 
contrast to other qualitative methods). The method, however, does require collecting 
appropriate type of netnographic data for each research project, grounding analysis in particular 
contexts, applying hermeneutic interpretation, determining and fulfilling ethical standards 
(Kozinets, 2010). 
The author can highlight several directions for the further research on NPOs/HROs financial 
accountability. Firstly, the observation type applied in this study gives an opportunity to collect 
currently available data. In further research, a higher level of interaction with the Internet 
community can be suggested. Secondly, the study claimed that accountants, managers, 
fundraisers and donors have various issues of concern, and, therefore, demand different types 
of accounting information. This diversity should be taken into account by any further research 
on the development of appropriate accounting principles and standards for nonprofits. Since a 
single accounting framework cannot satisfy the needs of all stakeholders, the interests of one 
of the groups may need to be prioritized. Finally, the findings of this paper provide a rich 
background for in-depth case studies on the financial accountability of HROs among the main 
issues of concern for HRO practitioners. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Table 1.1 - An overview of the main concerns of nonprofit practitioners  
Group/year 
of creation 
(becoming 
open) 
Total 
amount 
of 
members 
Contributed 
participants, 
total\from 
HROs 
Major 
location 
Professional 
majority 
Main issues 
of concern 
Other 
discussed 
issues 
Mango 
Worldwide 
(MNG)/ 
2010 
232 4\2 UK, 
Kenya, 
Pakistan 
Finance, 
project 
management  
Bribes, fraud, 
corruption and 
anticorruption 
measures  
Developing 
countries 
specifics, 
project 
management, 
costs 
allocation, 
costs 
minimization, 
partnership, 
grants 
application 
Governmental 
- Not-for-
Profit 
Accounting 
and Auditing 
Issues 
(GNPAAI)/     
2009   
1818 10\3 USA Accounting, 
Finance 
Nonprofit 
accounting 
and reporting 
issues, internal 
control, 
segregation of 
duties 
Accountability 
and reporting 
to donors, 
corporate 
governance, 
audit, IFRS, 
fraud 
Nonprofit 
Accounting & 
Grant 
Management 
(NPA&GM)/ 
2009 
6205 16\5 USA Accounting, 
Finance 
Financial 
reporting 
issues, costs 
allocation, 
revenue 
recognition 
Relationships 
with donors, 
performance 
measurement, 
corporate 
governance, 
needs for 
accounting 
standards 
improvement 
Charity UK 
(C_UK)/   
2010 
12357 4\1 UK Community 
and social 
services, 
consulting, 
marketing 
Different 
forms and 
challenges of 
fundraising,  
relationships 
with donors 
Corporate 
governance, 
ethical issues, 
performance 
measurement, 
reporting 
UK 
Fundraising 
(UK_F)/    
2009 
5035 6\3 UK Community 
and social 
services, 
consulting, 
marketing 
Fundraising, 
relationships 
with donors 
Compensation 
issues 
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Abstract 
Nonprofit accounting practices are challenged by the trend toward harmonization with business 
accrual accounting principles. At the same time, dissatisfied with the type of information 
presented in annual financial reports, its main users - institutional donors - create alternative 
reporting systems in parallel for NPOs they support. The paper undertakes a case study of a 
Norwegian human rights organization, the Rafto Foundation, explores the reasoning of the high 
financial accountability demands of its institutional donors, their information needs for 
decision-making and accountability, and the interlinkage between annual financial reporting 
and the alternative reporting systems. The study applies the analytical lenses of institutional 
logics and triangulation of qualitative methods. 
 
Keywords: financial accountability; nonprofit organizations; nonprofit accounting; 
institutional donors; institutional logics; real-life construct. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting is a calculating and social practice that is primarily oriented to the demands and 
desires of its users (Young, 2006; Hyndman, 1990; Mayston, 1992; Fortin, & Côté, 2007; 
Daniels & Daniels, 1991). There are two basic objectives of accounting: accountability and 
decision-making (Mellemvik, Monsen & Olson, 1988). These objectives are expressed in the 
approaches by accounting and financial reporting to all types of organizations: business 
enterprises, governmental bodies and nonprofit organizations (NPOs).   
In recent years, we have witnessed an international trend towards harmonizing nonprofit 
accounting with business accrual accounting. Accounting research indicates significant 
challenges to the practical implementation of nonprofit accounting when it is harmonized in 
this fashion. These challenges include the criticism that this accounting framework is irrelevant 
to the missions and activities of NPOs (Keating and Frumkin, 2003; Helmig, Jegers & Lapsley, 
2004; Christiaens and Rommel, 2008; Mook and Handy, 2010), perceived inconsistencies 
between the standards and practice (Conolly and Hyndman, 2000; Hooper, Sinclair & Hui, 
2008), evidence concerning the insufficient level of information  quality (Torres and Pina, 2003; 
Breen, 2013; Ryan, Mack, Tooley & Irvine, 2014), the non-correspondence of accounting 
reports with stakeholder demands (McDowell, Li & Smith, 2013; Sinclair and Bolt, 2013), and  
failure to address specific reporting issues (Mook and Handy, 2010). In addition, there are 
several calls for new forms of nonprofit financial reporting (Keating and Frumkin, 2003; 
Monsen, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014). 
Nonprofit organizations are accountable to a large number of widely differentiated  stakeholders 
(ICHRP, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Rupp, Kern & Helmig, 2014). In order to satisfy 
these demands for accountability, NPOs use various accountability mechanisms (Ebrahim, 
2010). Amidst this variety of accountability mechanisms, financial accounting information as 
a mechanism of accountability can only benefit those stakeholders who possess an adequate 
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level of accounting knowledge and economic competence to make thoughtful use of the 
information that is conveyed. Of the numerous stakeholders, donors have been named as the 
most salient stakeholders of NPOs (Assad & Goddard, 2010) who place a variety of demands 
for information about NPOs. Prior literature on nonprofit accountability claims that individual 
and institutional (organizational) donors have different accountability demands (Keating & 
Frumkin, 2003; ICHRP, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). The effect of accounting 
information on individual donors’ decision making to give funds to NPOs has been evaluated 
by several experimental studies (Trussel and Parsons, 2008; McDowell et al., 2013), and these 
studies yield mixed results.  
By contrast, the needs of institutional donors for accounting information have been explored to 
a lesser extent by scholarly research. This deficiency in scholarship is significant, because 
institutional donors often exercise their power to gain as much accounting and reporting 
information as they need from the NPOs they support. Frequently, institutional donors even 
demand special financial control and reporting (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; ICHRP, 2003; 
Ebrahim, 2003; 2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008) and arrange financial inspections (Assad & 
Goddard, 2010).  This power potentially affects all types of NPO stakeholders (especially, 
beneficiaries), because extensive reporting leads to resource outflows from the core missions. 
Prior research has acknowledged institutional donor – NPO tensions in relation to reporting and 
the establishment of its targets (Clayton, 1994; Hudock, 1999; Fowler, 1997; Ebrahim, 2003, 
2010) and has identified the mechanisms of donor influence and NPO resistance that is shaped 
in the forms of information flow between NPOs and their donors with the main focus on the 
decision-making and coping strategies in NPOs. To this point, however, the specific reasons 
that underlie the reporting demands of institutional donors, the types of accounting information 
they seek and their use of this information in their own decision processes remains unclear.  
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This paper undertakes an exploratory case study of a Norwegian human rights organization, the 
Rafto Foundation. The study applies the analytical lenses of institutional logics and 
triangulation of qualitative methods with a real-life construct within semi-structured interviews. 
The paper explores what types of accounting information the institutional donors demand, and 
seeks to discern the specific reasoning that underlies these demands while sketching out their 
implications for the accountability practices of HROs. Special attention is given to the 
interlinkage between the annual financial statement that is prepared according to accounting 
standards and the alternative reporting systems created by donors themselves.  
The paper has the following structure. The next section contains an overview of previous 
research on nonprofit accountability and accounting. Section 3 outlines the analytical lenses of 
institutional logics applied in the paper. Section 4 explains the research design, methodology 
and data collection. Section 5 presents the empirical context: the case and a brief overview of 
the Norwegian nonprofit sector and its accounting regulations. Section 6 contains the empirical 
findings. Section 7 provides summary discussion and offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.2.ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCOUNTING IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
2.2.1. Nonprofit accountability and stakeholders 
A phenomenon of nonprofit accountability, or “being held to account”, received significant 
research attention during the past twenty years (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006, 2010; Kilby, 2004; 
Ebrahim, 2003, 2010; Assad & Goddard ,2010; Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2012; Mook & Handy, 
2010; Cordes &Coventry, 2010; McCarthy, 2007; Saxton; Jenn-Shyong & Ho, 2012; 
Verbruggen, Christiaens & Milis, 2011; Schmitz, Raggo & Vijfeijken, 2012). Stakeholder 
theory asserts that an organization has obligations and responsibility (accountability) to 
different dynamic entities and needs to pay continuous attention to the interests of these groups. 
Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) classified stakeholders based on the characteristics of power 
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(ability to influence), legitimacy (socially accepted moral claims or formal relationship), and 
urgency (time-sensitive claims). Different groups of stakeholders have various requirements for 
HROs’ accountability and information based on their own interests and motives.  
According to its functional dimension, accountability is classified as downward (functional, 
hierarchical) or upward (social, holistic) accountability (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007, 2010; 
O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Ebrahim, 2010; Anheier, 2014). Table 2.1 presents an overview 
of the different types of accountability. 
 
Table 2.1 - Different types of accountability 
Upward accountability assumes that NPOs 
are supposed to be accountable to the fund 
providers, including donors, sponsors, 
governments, international institutions, and 
that these providers have a right to be 
informed about the fund spending. 
Downward accountability assumes that the 
priority for accountability be granted to NPO 
beneficiaries (recipients). 
Functional accountability supposes short-
term oriented accountability with a narrow 
focus on the financial indicators of NPO 
performance. 
Social accountability suggests that NPOs 
need to be broadly accountable for the direct 
and the indirect social impacts of their actions 
(in contrast with a narrow functional 
accountability focus on project activities). 
Hierarchical accountability is short-term 
accountability to NPO supporters with the 
use of quantitative indicators for measuring 
NPO performance.  
Holistic accountability seeks to combine 
upward and downward accountability and 
focuses on long-term sustainable outcomes 
of the nonprofit activism and mission 
achievement. 
Source: based on Unerman & O'Dwyer (2007, 2010); O’Dwyer & Unerman (2008, 2010) 
 
Even though research interest is trending towards exploring NPO accountability to society as a 
whole and to the beneficiaries of NPO activities (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007, 2010; O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2008; Ebrahim, 2010), there are significant reasons to continue investigating the 
financial accountability of NPOs, unpacking the reasoning that underlies donors’ demand for 
particular types of accounting information, and seeking improvements in the mechanisms of 
financial accountability. This agenda is influenced by the publicity surrounding recent financial 
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scandals and the legitimacy crisis in the nonprofit sector, the recognition of wide areas wherein 
NPOs could misuse their granted   funds and manipulate their financial data; the perceived need 
for higher levels of financial discipline; the unclear linkage (and possible overlap) between 
official financial reports and the reports required by donors; the need for better understanding 
of the background of financial reporting demands and the pressures in donor – NPO 
relationships. The legitimacy crisis, it can be stated, determines the increasing demand for the 
financial accountability of nonprofits (ICHRP, 2003; Schlesinger et al., 2004; O’Sullivan & 
O’Dwyer, 2009). The many financial scandals have had a significant impact on the nonprofit 
sector (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; Bothwell, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011). Even with extensive 
financial accountability demands, NPOs can and sometimes have manipulated their fund usage 
in specific areas, such as salaries, purchases, choice of the field partners, and administrative 
expenses.  This is related to inadequate evaluation (or even the complete lack of evaluation) of 
financial performance (the assessment of whether money has been spent in the most efficient 
way) (Sidel, 2005). Accounting scholars claim that truthfulness in financial reporting is one of 
the cornerstones for improving the legitimacy of NPOs (Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Schlesinger 
et al., 2004; Saxton et al, 2012). In addition, it is difficult to assume that a NPO that is not 
transparent and accurate in its financial transactions and is not itself in good financial health 
could deliver high-quality service to the recipients (beneficiaries) of its programs and activities. 
Moreover, it is important to note that upward and downward accountability are interdependent, 
at least in relation to the allocation of resources that NPOs spend in order to signal their 
accountability and fulfil accountability demands. O’Dwyer & Unerman (2008) warn that the 
predominant role played by hierarchical accountability among NPOs could lead to a trend “to 
measure impacts mechanically, in order to provide an impression of precision” (p.804). Too 
much of a focus on downward accountability, however, might make NPOs look like service-
oriented organizations to particular groups of recipients.  This might be dangerous for the 
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missions of those international empowering and advocacy NPOs that do not represent any 
particular vulnerable or disadvantaged population in their mission outreach, but are, in fact, 
campaigning against human rights violations all over the world. In this context, the responses 
of NPOs to accountability demands from different stakeholders need to be balanced carefully. 
 
2.2.2. Nonprofit accounting and users 
Financial accounting and reporting are the mechanisms and outcomes of NPO financial 
accountability. Unerman & O’Dwyer (2006) assert:  
Key accounting … strategies used by the NGOs to help build credibility 
included: judicious conformity to the accounting requirements of major donors; 
… [mentioning] the names of their high profile donors to provide comfort for 
other donors; managing the audit including appointing more expensive global 
audit firms for the added perception of credibility … greater transparency and 
accuracy of accounting information (pp. 311 – 312).   
 
For more than sixty years, the possible direction of nonprofit accounting development has been 
a frequently debatable issue. A long-term scientific debate on nonprofit accounting emerged in 
the 1950s (Figlewicz, Anderson & Strupeck, 1985), continued during the 1980s (Anthony, 
1980, 1987; Herzlinger and Sherman, 1980), and is ongoing here in the twenty-first century 
(Monsen, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014). Since Anthony’s evaluation of the distinction between 
accounting for commercial entities and accounting for nonprofit organizations, their differing 
priorities in the pursuit of financial information and organizational decision making, and his 
call to address various needs of accounting information for a wide range of stakeholders 
(Anthony, 1980), this subject has been much-discussed within the scholarly  community. 
Modern nonprofit accounting research expresses several focuses. Figure 2.1 presents an 
overview of these emphases from the more  general (relevance of existing accounting 
framework) to the more detailed (including challenges in application, concerns about the quality 
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of financial reports, surveys of the stakeholders’ (users’) needs, and the decision-usefulness of 
accounting information). 
 
Figure 2.1:  Focuses of nonprofit accounting research 
 
Within the first category, scholars question whether the existing accounting framework is 
appropriate for nonprofits. They claim that NPOs are different from business entities, and 
therefore they need a “purpose-designed” accounting framework (Christians and Rommel, 
2008; Monsen, 2014; Rossouw, 2007, 2013; Ryan et al., 2014). Profit maximization is the core 
objective of businesses (Knutsen & Brower, 2010). By contrast, NPOs are focused on providing 
services and do not have profit objectives (Gourdie & Rees, 2009). These organizations acquire 
revenues though one-way money transactions (donations) without providing a direct return to 
their donors, and they use budgets for the allocation of these donations to cover expenditures 
(Anheier, 2014; Monsen, 2010). The efficiency of nonprofits cannot be determined solely by 
the information in financial statements (Cordes &Coventry, 2010; Morgan & Fletcher, 2013); 
their revenue does not indicate the demand for services or performance. The existing business 
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and governmental accounting frameworks ignore the specifics of NPOs’ economic nature, 
mission orientation and accountability (Monsen, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014; European Center for 
Not-for-Profit Law, 2009), as well as neglecting the decision-making criteria of fund providers 
(Falk, Colin & Waterhouse, 1992).  
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) do not establish special standards for 
nonprofits, even though the International Accounting Standards Board acknowledges that not-
for-profit entities often have difficulties as they attempt to apply current accounting standards 
to their distinctive organizations and missions. The US Not-for-Profit Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) are themselves grounded on the principles of business accrual 
accounting (and this limits their applicability to the accountability of NPOs). 
Even though fund accounting principles are used by many NPOs on a level of project 
accounting and for reporting to donors, IFRS and GAAP do not allow fund principles to be 
applied as a reporting entity in financial reports (Breen, 2013; Rossouw, 2013). Larkin & 
DiTommaso (2013) in Wiley Not-for-Profit GAAP argue that readers of commercial financial 
statements are not aware of fund accounting principles, and this could be confusing and may 
well limit the decision usefulness of the information they gather from the reports. Consequently, 
they conclude: 
GAAP specifically requires the reporting of certain financial information by net 
asset classifications rather than funds. This does not mean the [nonprofit] 
organization will not keep detailed internal bookkeeping records on a fund 
accounting basis. It will still have to do so, or it will lose track of whether it is 
complying with donor-imposed restrictions (p. 79).  
 
Given the internal need for knowledge about the use of funds that have donor-imposed 
restrictions, NPOs are allowed to use fund accounting principles for internal purposes and for 
donor reporting, but they do not use these principles in preparing annual financial statements in 
accordance with accounting standards. In addition, the current accounting frameworks for 
73 
 
NPOs do not address properly the reporting of non-exchange transactions, such as restricted 
revenues (donations) (Rossouw, 2007, 2013; Ryan et al., 2014), volunteer labour (Mook and 
Handy, 2010) and fixed assets (Falk et al., 1992; Rossouw, 2013).  
The second category of nonprofit accounting research seems to support the use of accounting 
frameworks for nonprofits that are based on business accounting principles. Even so, scholars 
report significant complexities in the way NPOs apply these frameworks and note a significant 
failure in achieving the purpose of financial reporting; namely an inability to provide a useful 
basis for decision-making and accountability (Torres and Pina, 2003). They argue that the 
nonprofit sector is always given too low a level of attention and “third priority” (after for-profit 
and public sectors) in the process of accounting standards development (Torres and Pina, 2003). 
Lack of appropriate legislation has led to significant differences between accounting standards 
and accounting practice and crucial variations in reporting content in the nonprofit sector 
(Christensen and Mohr, 2003). Conolly & Hydman (2000) and Hooper et al. (2008) studied 
charity accounting in the UK and New Zealand, respectively. In both studies, the authors note 
that practice significantly deviates from accounting standards (for example, in the meaning of 
concepts), and the researchers propose clarifying concepts and advocate reducing diversity in 
accounting reports among NPOs. They touch briefly on the problem of accounting framework 
irrelevance, but they do not seek a solution beyond the pre-set accounting framework. 
The third research focus, the quality of accounting statements in the nonprofit sector and their 
ability to provide information for decision-making and report the value of donations, is a logical 
outcome from the two previous categories (Torres and Pina, 2003). Breen (2013) analyzed the 
reliability, consistency and comparability of financial reports of charities in Ireland, UK, and 
the US:  Examining these qualities under current accounting frameworks, the authors  claimed 
that the reports do not achieve these quality criteria in most of the cases they reviewed. 
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Because decision-usefulness is one of the major purposes of financial reports, the fourth 
category of nonprofit accounting research examines the information needs of NPO stakeholders 
and particular aspects of reports that are important for fundraising and accountability to donors. 
Accounting research of user needs in both the private and public sectors presents  significant 
challenges in defining the user of accounting information and linking user needs to specific 
settings in the accounting standards (Young, 2006; Hyndman, 1990; Mayston, 1992; Durocher 
et al., 2007; Daniels & Daniels, 1991). Young (2006) asserts that even though the standard 
setters have decided to link the purpose of accounting to financial statement users, “actual users 
were viewed as multiple, conflicting, inconsistent, uneducated…not only were they unreliable 
but little was known about their decision processes” (p. 596). These perceptions of users and 
their needs in the business sector have had an impact on how the nonprofit sector is assessed 
according to business accounting standards and the techniques originally developed to provide 
information on for-profit entities. 
There were several experimental studies to understand the effect of NPOs’ financial reports on  
individual donors’ decision making about their contributions to NPOs  (Trussel and Parsons, 
2008; McDowell et al., 2013).  McDowell et al. (2013) claim that individual donors prioritize 
nonfinancial information (missions, outcomes) over financial accounting information and  
explain this, in particular, by the fact that the accounting information provided by NPOs  does 
not correspond with  stakeholder demands. Keating and Frumkin (2003), however, note the 
absence of interest on the part of individual donors in the financial reports of nonprofits by 
individual donors and interpret this as an expression of their inability to access and understand 
the financial information of NPOs. These findings, however, are mostly relevant to individual 
donors and are not of great interest; it seems, to donor organizations. In contrast, Yetman 
&Yetman (2013) claim that donor organizations discount low-quality accounting information. 
Sinclair and Bolt (2013) studied whether the nonprofit stakeholders can affect the standards 
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setting. These researchers point to the low level of influence of stakeholders’ opinions on the 
standard-setters in New Zealand. By contrast, Conolly, Hyndman & McConville (2013) 
examined stakeholder engagement in the charity accounting standards-setting in the UK and 
report that stakeholders did not take the initiative to express their opinions to the standard-
setters. The scholars explained this by the fact that “small funders lacked the time, drive and 
platform to engage easily in a meaningful way … large funders could demand highly specific 
and detailed information directly from charities and therefore saw few benefits from 
engagement” (Conolly et al., 2013, p. 68). 
To summarize: the nonprofit accounting literature demonstrates, on the one hand, the 
complexities and the lack of a systematic approach in nonprofit accounting standards setting 
(what Anthony (1995) called “the nonprofit accounting mess”) and the irrelevance of 
information that the nonprofit accounting reports provide for potential users. On the other hand, 
the low interest of users in this information is also reported. With respect to the specifics of the 
nonprofit sector, it may well be that these two issues have some type of causal consequence.  
 
2.3. INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DONORS 
The forms and sources of donation shape the types of NPO-donor accountability relations. Each 
nonprofit organization has an opportunity to choose sources to which they apply for financial 
support. The major sources of revenue acquisition in the nonprofit sector include donations 
from individuals, grants from institutional foundations, government transfers, government 
grants (and contracts), business or corporate donations, and commercial activities (Froelich, 
1999; Anheier, 2014). 
Nonprofit research cites the existence of several groups of donors (individual/unprofessional 
and organizational/institutional), which have low or high accountability demand, respectively 
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(Keating & Frumkin, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Rupp et al., 2014). NPOs treat these 
groups in different ways: private donors are attracted based on their emotional motives. By 
contrast, grant providers and some financially astute private donors demand financial disclosure 
and performance evaluation.  
Even though NPOs prefer to diversify their funding sources in order to reduce the risk of 
financial vulnerability and resource dependence (Verbruggen et al., 2011), certain types of 
NPOs, in particular, empowering and advocacy human rights organizations, build their revenue 
streams on grants from institutional donors. These NPO-institutional donor relationships 
normally exist in the form of long-term, project-based partnerships that are built around the 
verification of reputation and credentials and elements of political lobbying. In addition, these 
relationships are well structured with a high level of accountability demand and formalized 
application and reporting processes. Moreover, “sophisticated donors [donors which impose 
grant restrictions] are more able or willing to unravel complex signals of low-quality reporting 
[and attach larger discounts] than are the average donors” (Yetman &Yetman, 2013, p. 1063). 
Because of this, institutional donors are able to have a significant impact on NPO accounting 
and reporting practices by requiring additional accounting information, imposing the 
application of donor-imposed restrictions, inspections, and demanding a high level of 
accountability for the funds that have been granted. 
Prior literature mostly focused on the actions and strategies of the NPOs to cope with or resist 
the high financial accountability demands of donors and to shape accounting and reporting 
practices according to these demands (Ebrahim, 2003, 2010); but the literature has neglected 
the need to explore the logic and reasoning processes of donors which might reveal their 
perception of NPO accountability and determine the nature of their accountability demands. 
Aiming to unpack the reasoning of institutional donors, this paper applies the analytical lenses 
of institutional logics.  
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Institutional logics is defined as “the material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules 
by which individuals [and organizations] produce and reproduce their material subsistence, 
organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, 
p. 101). Friedland & Alford (1991) identified several core institutions in society: the capitalist 
market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christianity, and this list was  further 
developed by Thornton (2004) into seven institutional orders: the market, the corporation, the 
professions, the state, the family, the community and religions. Each of these orders shapes 
specific institutional systems by providing a distinct set of logics, determined by such categories 
as source of legitimacy, source of authority, source of identity, basis of norms, basis of attention, 
basis of strategy (Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). These categories 
facilitate the identification of specific types of logics (orders).  
Garrow & Hasenfeld (2014) emphasize the explanatory potential of the lenses of institutional 
logics for the nonprofit sector. Knutsen (2012) asserts that NPOs often have to adapt to 
“external” institutional logics, such as the logics of fund providers and recipients depend on the 
type of funding they accumulate (private/governmental), as well as their mission and 
organizational type (membership/ civil society organization). These logics could conflict and 
confront each other in such way as to create an environment for the change of institutional 
logics themselves.  
Institutional logics are embedded in organizational practices and thereby shape individual and 
organizational actions by the collective identification of the actors, contests for status and 
power, classification and categorization, and the attention (priorities) of actors (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). The theory of attention asserts that “institutional logics focus the attention of 
decision makers on issues and solutions that are consistent with prevailing logics” (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008, p. 114; see also Thornton, 2004; Ocasio, 1997). Because the current nonprofit 
accountability research lacks a clear understanding of donors’ reasoning processes for asserting 
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specific information demands and expressing needs, the systematization and analysis of outputs 
(i.e. the expressed interests, values, accounting information priorities, focuses and demands of 
institutional donors) might well increase our knowledge and understanding of the specific logics 
(inputs) which determine these actions and prompt these outputs. Moreover, the exclusive status 
of institutional donors as the most salient type of NPO stakeholders affords them with the ability 
to act from the perspective of institutional entrepreneurs and thus to shape NPOs accounting 
and reporting logics and embedded practices in distinctive ways.  
 
2.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This paper aims to contribute to user-need accounting research (Young, 2006; Hyndman, 1990; 
Mayston, 1992; Durocher et al., 2007; Daniels & Daniels, 1991) by exploring the needs of 
financial reporting users, analyzing the reasons and motives for their information demands and 
discussing their impact on HRO accountability practices in a specific empirical context. 
Considering donors as external stakeholders who are supposed to consume accounting and 
reporting information provided by the HRO to external users, this paper compares the donor 
demands with the information supplied in annual financial reports.  This study examines the 
demands and the supplies of accounting information by looking at the circulation of information 
between the HRO and its donors in every stage of interaction (grant application, grant decision, 
evaluation of ongoing projects, ex-post reporting and evaluation, long-term cooperation); 
examines the routines, practices and informational background of the decisions that shape 
giving and their ex-post evaluation, and discusses specific foci, key-points and expectations of 
the decision-makers in the donor organizations.   
 
 
79 
 
2.4.1. Triangulation of methods 
The triangulation of qualitative methods is applied to fulfil the objective of this study. 
Methodological literature traditionally suggests addressing explorative research questions such 
as “how and why” by using instruments of qualitative methodology (Yin, 2003; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994; Berg & Lune, 2012). Triangulation of methods facilitates the achievement of a 
comprehensive understanding of complex phenomena (Modell, 2009; Hopper & Hoque, 2006) 
and enhances the validity of research interpretations (Marginson, 2004). Figure 2.2 presents the 
research design of this paper.   
   
 
Figure 2.2: Research design 
 
The research design consists of four different components: a case study, stakeholder mapping, 
interviews and a real-life construct. The design is founded on a principle of constantly 
narrowing the research focus and the theoretical sampling, i.e. choosing the samples in which 
the research interest is “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Hammersley &Atkinson, 2007). Within the case study of the Rafto Foundation that is 
conducted through direct observation and document analysis, the author identified the relevant 
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groups of actors by means of stakeholder mapping. After the mapping, the representatives of 
these stakeholders were interviewed. The analysis of the interviews was supplemented by 
presenting the interviewee with what is called a “real-life construct” (Lapsley & Llewellyn, 
1995; Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2004; Hellstrom & Lapsley, 2016). This involves the creation of 
an alternative scenario that is intended to contextualize the discussion of the interviews, provide 
a focal point for commentary to be aimed at and to facilitate the identification of salient values 
for analysis. The new set of documents (“parallel” reports required by the donors and the 
guidelines for these reports) has been explored during interviews and was analysed during a 
later stage of research. The forthcoming subsections provide a detailed explanation of each 
component of the research design.   
 
2.4.2. Case study 
Presupposing the strengths of the case study method and its potential for enhancing financial 
accounting research, this study undertakes an exploratory case study as a non-laboratory social 
study method. The case study approach expresses analytical, systemic  and individual 
perspectives (Yin, 2003) and is a valuable tool by means of which a researcher can assess 
complex phenomena and evaluate practices that are influenced by multiple actors within natural  
settings, “real life” contexts (Cooper and Morgan, 2008). In addition, the case study method 
allows for the involvement of the researcher who can play the alternative roles of outsider, 
visitor, facilitator or actor (Ryan et al., 2002). The dynamics of the case study method make 
possible the provision for simultaneous data collection and analysis (Hartley, 2004) and 
encourages a continuous learning process (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979).  
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2.4.3. Stakeholder map 
Due to technical and conceptual complexity, financial accounting information seems to attract 
the attention of and be comprehensible only to selected groups of NPO stakeholders—those 
who have appropriate education, knowledge and experience. Board members, management, 
donors, sponsors, partners, government and monitoring groups are generally the only 
stakeholders who demand and can make effective use of the financial accountability of NPOs.  
Prior to the interviews, the author had two meetings with one of the managers of the Rafto 
Foundation, seeking a general overview of the accounting and reporting practices within the 
organization and potential users of financial reporting information. Even though the NPO under 
study has a significant variety of stakeholders, the author identified three specific groups of 
actors (stakeholders) from whom knowledge might be accumulated and who could provide 
significant and detailed information appropriate for the purpose of this study. These key groups 
include employees engaged in management, fundraising and reporting, Rafto board members, 
and institutional donors.    
 
2.4.4. Interviews 
The method of semi-structured interviews (Smith, 2011) was implemented in the case study to 
acquire knowledge about the accounting practices of the Rafto Foundation, the needs of the 
stakeholders in terms of financial reporting information, accountability relationships between 
the HRO and its donors, decision-making and accountability routines. This method permitted 
the discovery of the kinds of information that the users need, the opportunity to identify 
accounting emphases that may have gone missing in the annual financial statement and to 
consider alternative sources of information. The interview questionnaire was constructed to 
address the type of stakeholder who was interviewed (see Appendix 2.1 for an example).  
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2.4.5. Real-life construct. Official and alternative financial statements 
Aiming to discover a linkage between the annual financial report and alternative sources of 
accounting information, the interview design is enhanced by the incorporation of a real-life 
construct (RLC) to facilitate the analysis. The idea of RLC is to contextualize qualitative and 
quantitative accounting information in order to provide respondents with a scenario (model) of 
how something might look and to use this as a background for the interview (Lapsley & 
Llewellyn, 1995; Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2004; Hellstrom & Lapsley, 2016). The particular 
strength of RLC within this research design is its applicability for gauging the influence of 
accounting information on the decision-making processes that are embedded in a specific social 
context: 
An RLC is an information assemblage which is derived from actual 
organizational practices. It combines real qualitative and quantitative data to 
form a focal point for case studies which explore decision-making processes in 
organizations…This setting requires a recognition that decisions involve value 
judgements, may have to balance competing objectives, and take place in an 
uncertain environment (Lapsley & Llewellyn, 1995, p. 224). 
 
An RLC “Alternative design of financial reports for the Rafto Foundation” (Appendix 2.4) was 
used to facilitate the discussions with the interviewees. Alternative accounts within the 
framework of fund accounting have been prepared for the Rafto Foundation in Raftorapport 
(Monsen, 2015).  Based on this work, two alternative financial statements were developed in 
Raftorapport (Monsen, 2015): an overview of revenues and expenditures and an overview of 
money status. The overview of revenues and expenditures shows revenues and expenditures 
that have been incurred during the most recent 3-year period (2011-2013), budgetary revenues 
and expenditures for the latest year (2013), as well as the variance between the accounting and 
budgetary figure for this year.  
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2.4.6. Data collection and data analysis 
The process of data collection commenced in December 2014 with meetings with one of the 
managers of the Rafto Foundation and the evaluation of provided documents (annual reports 
and financial statements, the grant agreement between the HRO and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, a general ledger, an annual budget, etc.). After that, the mapping of relevant 
stakeholders (donors, employees, and board members) took place.  
Development of an interview questionnaire was completed in July 2015. An establishment of 
necessary contacts with the external stakeholders took place within five months (May - 
September 2015).  Contrasting with the theoretical assumption of general willingness of 
nonprofit practitioners to participate in interviews due to the general transparency of the 
nonprofit sector and the wish “to talk about their work … with interested outsiders” (King, 
2004, p. 12), several potential participants appeared to find financial accounting a sensitive 
topic. Due to the limited number of potential interviewees (the studied HRO has 4–5 major 
institutional donors), the researcher had to develop two additional explanations for successful 
enrolment of these practitioners in the interview process. First, the author had to specify that 
participation in the interviews for this research project did not require education or experience 
in accounting. Secondly, the researcher had to explain that she did not intend to “check” 
compliance of annual reports with the accounting standards or to trace financial flows.  
Simultaneously, two pilot interviews were conducted with the board members of NPOs that are 
external to the Rafto case, in order to test the questionnaire. After these interviews, three 
employees, two board members and eight representatives of institutional donors of the Rafto 
Foundation were interviewed within a four-month period (see Table 2.2).  
Each interview with the donor representatives enhanced the study with the new documents for 
analysis (such as forms of the reports required by the donors, guidelines and manuals for filling 
out these forms, forms for grant applications and their manuals, guidelines for processing grant 
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applications, decision-making and evaluation of reports). Within the process of document 
analysis (Appendix2.2), four interviewees were contacted again to address follow-up questions.  
The process of data analysis included data reduction, data display, and verification (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; O’Dwyer, 2004). A professional software program for qualitative and mixed 
methods data analysis MAXQUDA was applied as an ancillary tool for the systematization and 
analysis of the documents and analytical coding. 
 
Table 2.2 – The interviews for the case study of the Rafto Foundation 
Organization/body Type of stakeholder Number of 
interviewees
Pilot study (NPO representatives 
outside the Rafto case for the test of 
interview design) 
Board members 2 
The Rafto Foundation Employees in managerial 
positions 
3 
Board of Directors of the Rafto 
Foundation 
Board members 1 
Nonprofit association “Fritt Ord” 
(“The Freedom of Expression”)  
Representatives of the donor 
organization 
3 
Bergen Municipality Representative of the donor 
organization 
1 
Regional Bank Representative of the donor 
organization 
1 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
Representatives of the donor 
organization 
2 
The Norwegian Ministry of Education  Representative of the donor 
organization 
1 
 
The interview data and the findings of the document analysis were interpreted from the 
positions of critical and alternate templates research perspectives through the identification of 
patterns and the finding of distinctive meanings in patterns (Belk, Fischer & Kozinets, 2013; 
Lukka & Modell, 2010). The hermeneutic approach is applied for data interpretation and 
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structuration. For this approach: hermeneutic interpretations have to be “coherent and free of 
contradiction,” “comprehensible” to the intended reading audience, “supported with relevant 
examples,” clearly related to “relevant literature,” “enlightening” and “fruitful” in revealing 
new dimensions of the problem at hand” (Arnold & Fischer, 1994, p. 64). 
 
2.5. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
2.5.1. The nonprofit sector of Norway and its accounting regulation 
According to the Norwegian Register Centre (Brønnøysundregistrene), there are more than 85 
thousand NPOs registered in Norway as of 2014. Many well-established Norwegian NPOs rely 
on grants from institutional donors, including various governmental and municipal agencies, 
businesses and nonprofit foundations (Angells, 2008). According to Lange, Spissøy & Brudvik 
(2002), there are over 30 acting business-NPOs partnerships in Norway, which are oriented to 
the synergy of professional competences in the development of joint projects and products.  
These close NPOs-government and NPOs-business collaborations developed naturally in 
Norway, and sometimes this constitutes a challenge in the eyes of outsiders regarding the 
independence of nonprofits.  Hopgood (2006) in his anthropological study of the Amnesty 
International (AI) reported: 
AI Norway…made a presentation on its human rights education work with the 
Norwegian oil company Statoil that drew criticism from other [AI] members. One 
delegate from AI Ireland said she was disturbed to see the AI logo near the Statoil 
logo on the screen and worried about the “contamination of that image (p. 196). 
 
The Norwegian Accounting Act regulates accounting and financial reporting practices of the 
Norwegian NPOs. The current act was adopted in 1998 and went into effect early in 1999. The 
act was developed primarily for business enterprises. The accounting act requires the 
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preparation of two financial statements: result and balance sheet statements. The act applies to 
all types of organizations operating in Norway, except the public sector entities.  
Accounting regulation for some types of organizations, such as NPOs and small entities, could 
vary from the basic principles of the accounting act when this is in accordance with good 
accounting practice for these organizations. Moreover, they could also vary from the specific 
design of the two financial statements required by the accounting act (i.e., the result and balance 
sheet statements). In 2000, the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board issued a Norwegian 
accounting standard for small economic entities (NRS 8) which lays down good accounting 
practice for these organizations. Currently this standard is applicable to organizations that do 
not exceed the limits of at least two of the following three criteria: sales revenue of NOK 70 
million, balance amount of NOK 35 million, average number of employees during the financial 
year of 50. As a follow-up, the Board has also established a preliminary accounting standard 
(NRS (F)), which stipulates good accounting practice for organizations without profit 
objectives, including nonprofit organizations and foundations. A study of the accounting 
standard for NPOs revealed its complexities and ambiguity (see Solbakken and Monsen, 2008). 
The standard departs from use of the profit accrual principle of the Accounting Act, but it also 
requires that some revenues and expenditures be accrued by use of a money accrual principle 
when they are received and paid in cash. As a result, a corresponding mixture could be found 
in two related financial statements: activity accounts and balance sheet. 
Given these regulations, there are three accounting systems in Norway that might be  applied 
by NPOs: general accounting standards, accounting standards for NPOs, and accounting 
standards for small entities (SME). Norway aims to harmonize its national accounting standards 
with IFRS. IFRS is adopted for publicly listed companies. IFRS for SMEs has not yet been 
adopted in Norway. A new Norwegian accounting act is currently being drafted, and 
presumably, it will provide the small entities with the option to choose between NRS 8 and 
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IRSR-for-SMEs in their separate financial statements. It is unclear what will happen with NRS 
(F) for nonprofit organizations under the provisions of the new Norwegian accounting act.    
According to the information the author has received from the Norwegian Register Centre 
(Brønnøysundregistrene), only 5 per cent of all NPOs in Norway choose to apply special 
accounting standards for NPOs. It seems that only NPOs that cannot fulfil the criteria of 
accounting standards for SMEs apply the accounting standards for NPOs.  
 
2.5.2. The Rafto Foundation 
The Rafto Foundation (in Norwegian – Raftostiftelsen) is a well-established organization with 
more than 25 years of activism dedicated to the global promotion of human rights. It was 
established in the humanistic tradition of the Helsinki Accord. The activities of the Rafto 
Foundation include the Rafto Prize that is awarded for human rights work; follow-up projects 
in cooperation with former Rafto Prize laureates; human rights educational courses on human 
rights issues for pupils, students and teachers; information and lobbying activities. Even though 
“stiftelsen” is translated from Norwegian as a “foundation”, the Rafto Foundation is neither a 
foundation nor an HRO within the classical definition of each. In contrast to traditional 
foundations, the Rafto Foundation operates its own educational projects and delivers 
educational services for Norwegian schools and students. At the same time, the organization 
provides financial support to winners of the Rafto Prize for human-rights work outside Norway 
on a non-systematic basis. In contrast with HROs, the Rafto Foundation does not directly target 
“needy” groups, people requiring human rights defence, or address the prevention of human 
rights violations. Given these constraints, the Rafto Foundation could be defined as a “hybrid” 
organization, having characteristics of both a foundation and an HRO at the same time. 
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The Rafto Foundation has an extensive network of various private and public financial 
supporters and partners who make different types of contributions. Figure 2.3 presents the 
stakeholder map of the Rafto Foundation. 
 
Figure 2.3: The stakeholders of the Rafto Foundation 
 
Similar to the funding of many other Norwegian NPOs (Angells, 2008), financial grants from 
the state authorities are the major funding source of the Rafto Foundation. Strong reliance on 
support from the institutional donors, long-term partnerships and well-established relationships 
with them have determined the previous research interest in the study of the Rafto Foundation.  
The Rafto Foundation prepares its official accounts in accordance with the accounting rules in 
the Norwegian Accounting Act for small entities. Annual financial statements contain the result 
statement and balance sheet (see Appendix 2.3). The Norwegian Accounting Act does not 
require that small enterprises prepare a supplementary cash flow statement. 
89 
 
2.6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section provides an overview of the case study findings based on the interviews and 
document analysis. The first sub-section reveals the role of annual financial reports prepared 
according to the accounting standards in terms of their capacity to satisfy the accountability 
demands of the institutional donors. The second sub-section outlines different levels of 
accountability demands and the types of accounting information demanded in parallel reporting 
systems. The third sub-section analyses selected reasons and motives of donors for high 
accountability demands. The fourth sub-section treats positive and negative outcomes of 
financial accountability demands and the alternative reporting systems on HRO accountability 
practices. 
 
2.6.1. The role of annual financial reports 
A supposition that an annual financial report is a document created according to the accounting 
standards in order to satisfy the needs of external users of any organization has been taken as 
the starting point for analyzing  the informational demands of the Raft Foundation donors. 
Consistent with this supposition, the interviewees are also assured that the main purpose of the 
annual financial report is to demonstrate its compliance with accounting standards.  Most of 
respondents are not familiar with the fact that the Norwegian Accounting Act provides an 
opportunity to choose between three different regimes, including the standards for NPOs. 
The employees of the HRO claim that they rely on the opinion of the external accountant in 
relation to decision-making with regard to the choice of accounting framework and other 
financial reporting decisions. This can happen in NPOs where accounting is outsourced and 
management and board members do not experience clear linkage between financial stability 
and mission achievement. Two Big 4 firms deliver accounting and auditing services to the Rafto 
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Foundation. The annual costs of these services are equal to the prize amount awarded by the 
Foundation annually with the Rafto Prize for Human Rights to advocates of human rights and 
democracy. 
An application of the accounting standards for SMEs that are irrelevant to this type of 
organization causes inconvenient complexities for understanding these financial statements and 
may mislead potential users. For example, the Rafto Foundation reports about 2,000,000 NOK 
in costs of goods sold (inventory expenses). At the same time, the Rafto Foundation does not 
sell any goods and therefore does not have the inventory expenses. Moreover, the Rafto 
Foundation reports an ordinary result before tax and an annual result (after tax). These two 
results are identical, because the Rafto Foundation is not taxable and, therefore, it is presumed 
not to have a profit result before tax or an annual result after tax. The only reason why the 
organization still reports these particular results is the accounting regulations, which require all 
types of companies to report their annual results both before and after tax. In addition, even 
though donations are the main source of revenues for the Rafto Foundation, it uses the account 
designated as “Accounts receivable”. The name of this account comes from business sector 
accounting and is not relevant to a nonprofit organization since a donor is not the equivalent of 
a customer.  
The management of the Rafto Foundation states that the HRO has never received any feedback 
on the official financial reports from the donors and this, together with the continuous financial 
flows, is to be considered as a positive signal of donor satisfaction. The representatives of donor 
organizations state that the annual financial report, together with the auditor’s report, is a 
standard document required from NPOs at the stages of grant application and reporting. They 
also claim that a single financial statement does not provide an adequate background for 
decision-making due to its lack of relevant information.  
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2.6.2. Levels of accountability demands and type of information demanded 
In the situation where official financial statements do not provide users with sufficient 
accounting information and when certain stakeholders (specifically, institutional donors) hold 
significant power over the operations of the HRO being studied, these users are able to establish 
supplementary (parallel) reporting systems in order to satisfy their own informational needs. 
Four out of five institutional donors require the Rafto Foundation to provide additional 
accounting reports. Before any grant is given, the HRO has to sign an agreement that it will 
report to the donor according to the reporting forms and guidelines that the donor provides. 
Some donors require the electronic signature confirming the potential compliance with donor 
reporting requirements from all grant applicants. 
The interviews and analysis of the supplementary reports reveal that donors prioritize the 
following aspects of accounting information:  
• Project-based accounting/fund-based accounting (low interest to aggregated reporting 
information); 
• Detailed description of revenues (information about other donors, state/private sources, 
domestic/foreign sources, etc.) for sharing the risk with other fund providers; 
• Detailed description of expenditures; program, administrative and fundraising divisions; donor-
imposed restrictions; 
• Budgetary figures and compliance with budgets. 
The donor representatives claim that comparability of financial results within the several years 
(to check “progress” and “positive trend”) and accounting figures with the budgets (which the 
presented RLC provides) is important for assessing NPO financial performance.  
Due to the NPO resource dependence and an absence of any legislation that regulates these 
parallel reporting systems, each donor performs the role of the “rules of the game setter” in its 
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relationships with the NPO and designs the reporting system in a way it prefers, often bringing 
its own governance patterns to the nonprofit sector. 
For instance, the reporting requirements vary among the different donors, which allows 
assessing different levels of accountability demand for each donor (see Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: The level of accountability demand among the donors of the Rafto Foundation 
 
Three donors with the highest level of accountability demand, the Ministry of Education, the 
Bergen Municipality and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), all belong to the state group 
of donors. Applying institutional logics terminology, the paper refers to this group as 
“bureaucratic state” donors. The state support is well regulated (for example, the MFA Grant 
Management Manual contains 130 pages), requires extensive reporting (see Appendix 2.2), and 
may affect the mission and agenda of the organization to a great extent since the supported NPO 
needs to fit all criteria of a specific certain line within the state budget. The “bureaucratic state” 
donors emphasize the importance of budgetary discipline for the NPOs they support (bringing 
this pattern from the public sector). In order to prevent inconsistency between project budgets 
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and submitted reports, the donors require that “the financial report … include[s] project 
accounts with related explanations, and must be presented according to the same structure and 
elements as in the approved, detailed budget.”2 At the same time, the relationships with the 
“bureaucratic state” donors are more secure and predictable for the HRO. State grants received 
by the Rafto Foundation are provided for a period of several years each.  
The Regional Bank and the nonprofit association “Fritt Ord” (from the Norwegian, “The 
Freedom of Expression) both belong to the “community” type of donors. The Regional Bank 
provides grants to organizations and individual activists for the projects contributing to 
development of a specific geographical location in Norway (where the Rafto Foundation is 
territorially located). The bank usually does not disclosure publicly the organizations; this is so 
they do not prioritize particular NPOs over others. Fritt Ord Association supports NPOs and 
individuals “for projects within the areas of media and democracy, information and public 
debate, grants and training [stimulating interest to the freedom of expression] and art and 
culture.”3 Financial support from the “community” donors is less demanding in relation to 
reports, but the grants are usually limited to a one-year period. These donors typically rotate the 
organizations they support in order to provide all NPOs/projects in their community with a fair 
share of their funding.  
 
2.6.3. The reasons for accountability demands and their impact on HRO practices 
Nonprofit financial accountability is a complex phenomenon that emerges and develops in the 
area of socio-economic interactions (in the studied case, between the HRO and its institutional 
donors) and therefore is shaped by multiple reasons and motives.  
                                                            
2 Final report for grants from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), S81 – Final report form for 
project/programme support 
3 http://www.frittord.no/en/prosjektstotte/programomrader 
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The interviews reveal that the donor’s desire to control is the initial driver for creation of the 
parallel reporting systems. One grant manager (MFA) claims: 
The new reporting system tries to cover more space, all previous gaps…For 
example, more control over the local partners. 
 
The level of control is further determined by the level of expected risk, legitimacy and 
reputation (both of the donor and the NPO), the donor’s trust, the dependency of the NPO, and 
the size and condition of the particular grant. Each of these components is likely to have a 
complex structure that is determined by other factors and could cause high accountability 
demands in and of themselves. For example, according to Atack (1999), the legitimacy of an 
NPO is shaped by four criteria: representativeness, distinctive values, effectiveness and 
empowerment. 
In the studied case, the donor’s desire to control is implemented in the following reporting 
practices and accountability procedures:  
– determination of the required accountability level,  
– requirement of parallel (supplementing) reports,  
– suggestion of the form and frequency of the supplementing reports,  
– assistance in quality improvement of the reports,   
– linkage of extensiveness  of required reporting with the level of uncertainty/risk and the 
size of the grant,  
– requirement of internal control,  
– application of restricted funds,  
– creation of the “ideal” NPO-partner image.  
For instance, the representatives of the three institutional donors with the highest level of 
accountability demand (the “bureaucratic state” type of donors) claimed that they provide 
feedback on the HRO reporting and that the quality of reports affects the forthcoming donations. 
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Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Bergen Municipality assist in quality 
improvement of the reports; the report can go back and forth from the NPO to the donor until 
it is finally approved. A grant manager (MFA) explains: 
 If we [MFA] see that the application is very relevant, but the [project] budget 
[a part of the grant application] is not good enough, then we could go back to 
this organization and inform them that they need to do better…We have 
experienced that with some applications we could go back and forth 3 – 5 
times….If they want to get the money, they need to deliver what we would 
require [regarding the quality of the documents] … With the size of the Rafto 
Foundation grant - they must have good reports.  
 
In addition, the MFA could request the HRO to highlight some aspects of its activities in its 
report (aspects that this particular donor deems of interest to its own goals), and in this way, the 
donor would affect the content of report. Such an approach may well be interpreted as meeting 
a need of the supported NPO to follow precisely specific bureaucratic patterns and well-
specified routines to satisfy the type of donor. In contrast, if the “community” type of donors 
does not provide feedback on the content and quality of reporting, this could signal a higher 
level of trust in the HRO or the donor’s lower interest in the function of the reports as 
mechanisms for assessing HRO performance.  
The study reveals that all donors seek to share their risk with other fund providers. Several 
instruments are applied for controlling risk and eliminating uncertainty, including the demand 
for different levels of reporting for different projects and from different NPOs (new versus 
trustworthy long-term partners), disclosing the sources of revenues, manifest ability to 
demonstrate revenues from other sources. There is also a linkage between the extensiveness of 
required reporting (frequency, detail) with the level of uncertainty/risk taken by the donor. For 
example, the MFA provides three types of grants: project and program support, general grants 
and small-scale grants. For the first category, financial reporting is mandatory; for the second, 
optional (mandatory only for the certain types of grants); for the third category, not mandatory 
in any circumstance. The Regional Bank delegates its representatives to participate in the 
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project boards when it provides an NPO with funding that exceeds 250 000 NOK. In addition, 
in all donor organizations, a group of 3–5 professionals who independently evaluate the grant 
applications and the reports makes the decisions on donations collectively. All these methods 
show that risk could be secured by achieving a high level of access to accounting information. 
The previous sub-section demonstrates that even though donors are the external stakeholders, 
they require management accounting information that in the business sector would be available 
only for the internal purposes.  
As another instrument of control, four out of five donor organizations impose restrictions on 
the donated grants (see Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3 - Donor-imposed restrictions on the grants provided to the Rafto Foundation 
Donor Purpose of the grant (restriction) 
The Freedom of Expression  Rafto prize 
Bergen Municipality (Department of Culture) General maintenance  
Regional Bank Rafto prize 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Human rights activities (project 
support, widely defined) 
The Norwegian Ministry of Education Education services 
 
For example, the grant agreement with the MFA allows the HRO to spend only 7 per cent of 
the donated amounts on indirect purposes. The case reveals, however, that donor-imposed 
restriction on grants is not the most prominent instrument through which to control that funds 
are spent in the most effective way when it comes to empowering and advocacy NPOs. In other 
words, the types of the HRO activities allow diversity regarding mission-oriented expenses, and 
if the organization does not exceed its original budget, there is no control that the purchases and 
labour expenses are taken in the most cost-effective way.  
97 
 
In addition to the reporting mechanisms that are supposed to increase the level of donors’ 
awareness and control over donated resources, certain reporting procedures applied by the 
donors could interfere with the operational independence of the HRO. The respondents state 
that the annual meetings of the NPO with each donor are important events during which 
reporting takes place. During such meetings, the donors provide their feedback and 
opportunities for further cooperation are discussed.  The MFA manager asserts: 
[An NPO] has annual reports and annual meeting [MFA and NPO]. When [NPO] 
has multi-year agreement, annual meeting is the key…They present the annual 
report during the annual meeting…and based on this we [MFA and NPO] agree 
what we should do the next year…If…[NPO]  has a multi-year agreement and 
is working in the country that we [MFA] are no longer give priority to, we could 
direct them to other country, for instance…we [MFA and NPO] could find out 
together  that we are not going to work more in Columbia…because it is no more 
a priority or it was not successful, but what you [NPO]  are done in the 
neighbouring country is perfect and we [MFA] would like to point you [NPO]  
more towards this neighbouring country…This is what we are going to discuss 
during the annual meeting. 
 
Moreover, the “bureaucratic state” donors create an image of an ideal NPO-partner where high 
quality of financial reports and compliance with accountability requirements become the 
hallmark. For example, MFA is moving towards financing only large-scale professional NPOs. 
An MFA manager explains: 
 Here is the clear difference between big professional NGOs [nongovernmental 
organization] and small NGOs….for small NGOs it is much more difficult to 
deliver good applications and good budgets… We come to the conclusion that the 
small NGOs could create more damage, especially in crisis areas. 
 
The desire of the institutional donors to work only with the long-term trustworthy NPO-partners 
and well-established large-scale professional NPOs makes it extremely difficult for new small- 
and medium-scale NPOs to compete for funding. In addition, financial scrutiny of the new 
partners would be much higher. 
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2.6.4. Positive and negative outcomes of alternative reporting systems on the HRO 
accountability practices 
Based on the studied case, the paper identifies both positive and negative outcomes of financial 
accountability demands of the institutional donors from the organization. These outcomes could 
shed the light on economic reality of NPOs relationships with their institutional donors in 
situations where the business sector demand-supply mechanisms could not obviously be 
applied. 
The positive outcomes include the following: 
– Sanitary purposes (an ability to identify NPOs financial impropriety): Long-term donors 
show a high level of knowledge (awareness) of HROs financial health, routines and practices;  
– Educational purposes (providing feedback to the NPOs on their financial reports, improving 
the reporting forms and manuals): One of the respondents has used the term “good 
standardization,”, i.e. all long-term NPO-partners (especially, those cooperating with the state 
donors) at some point of time would have to demonstrate a high quality of internal control, 
budgets, applications, and reporting systems which would standardize these systems to a large 
extent (same purpose as the accounting standards have); 
– Increasing financial discipline of NPOs:  The institutional donors are the only stakeholders 
that have the interest (and more importantly) the knowledge and expertise, to emphasize and 
control the financial accountability, discipline and transparency of the Rafto Foundation. The 
paper shows that the regulatory bodies cannot achieve this purpose by using the official 
financial reporting mechanisms. The beneficiaries (the Rafto prize-winners from the developing 
countries and the students who engage in human rights education) do not have sufficient 
accounting qualification and interest; the board is quite powerful in decision-making, but at the 
same time is very “academic” and does not signal its independence from the HRO management.  
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It also lacks a sufficient number of members who have a background in economics. The self-
accountability and the financial self-discipline of NPOs are questionable.  
The possible negative outcomes of donors’ financial accountability demands include the 
following: 
– There is no borderline between demanding information for reporting purposes and a direct 
intervention in organizational activities (affecting targets, management decisions);  
– Reporting overload (different donors require that the organization provides separate detailed 
reports to each of the donors); 
– High financial accountability demands and the forms provided for reporting and the 
reporting manuals do not lead to the control of spending; i.e. spending in the most efficient 
manner;  
– Donors have a concept of an ideal NPO-partner;  
To be eligible to receive grant support, the NPO needs to fit specified criteria of a certain budget 
line and to comply with international and local socio-economic and political trends. At the same 
time, the history of financial scandals in the nonprofit sector (see Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; 
Bothwell, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011) demonstrates that the sheer size of NPOs does not guarantee 
their financial propriety and that even well established professional NPOs are frequently 
involved in cases of funding misuse, corruption and financial fraud. 
 
2.7.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study explores the accounting information demands of NPO stakeholders with a special 
focus on the institutional donors of empowering and advocacy NPOs. Shedding the light on the 
aspects of HRO reporting that receive the highest level of attention from the institutional donors 
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creates an opportunity to understand the reasoning behind these demands, the embedded logics 
and the impact of the reporting on HRO-donor accountability practices.     
The study reveals the existence of two types of reporting systems that function in parallel: the 
annual financial reporting in accordance with accounting standards and the reporting systems 
created by the donors. These two systems differ from each other regarding the level of 
information aggregation and accounting principles that they apply. The accounting standards 
aim to achieve standardization, simplification and aggregation of accounting information. In 
contrast, the reporting systems created by the donors require management accounting 
information from the NPO, more details on the level of project (fund) accounting and evidence 
of budgetary discipline. In this situation, NPOs that have limited financial and labor resources 
must handle the burden of these two reporting systems. Regarding the official financial 
reporting, the case underscores the significant role of external accounting consultants who 
determine the accounting practices of the HRO and align accounting routines between the 
nonprofit and the business sectors (in this case, between NPOs and SMEs). These consultants 
are not among the users of annual financial reports of nonprofits and, therefore, they give higher 
priority to purposes of standardization and compliance with the standards rather than to the 
goals of user satisfaction and decision-usefulness.     
The study demonstrates that in the situation where specific users (institutional donors) are not 
satisfied with the financial reporting information that is provided in accordance with accounting 
standards, they have enough power and interest to demand an alternative type of reporting. 
Going through the continuous cycles of improvement and modification in order to achieve a 
high level of control and minimization of risk, these information demands create alternative 
reporting systems (realities) that parallel the official system. These demands are usually 
determined by donors’ desires to control, eliminate risk, and increase legitimacy, trust and 
dependence.  
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The paper claims that the institutional donors create these alternative reporting systems within 
the scope of their own logics, patterns of governance and constructs of accountability and 
legitimacy. Initially having different purposes, “community” donors and “bureaucratic state” 
donors shape their accountability demands in differing ways that affect the reporting systems 
they design for the NPO that they support. The bureaucratic logics that predominate in the 
public sector determine the creation of similar types of extensive reporting for the nonprofit 
fund recipients.  The state donors demand a high level of applied control because they are acting 
on behalf of the state and are redistributing public money. They seek trustworthy long-term 
partners in the nonprofit sector who are able to deliver specific services and provide high-
quality reports. The state donors also use these reports to legitimate their giving actions in the 
eyes of controlling institutions (including the Parliament and the Office of the Auditor General) 
and the public. By contrast, the “community” donors prioritize “commitment to community 
values and ideology” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 53). Given this goal, their levels of 
accountability demands are lower, the reporting systems they create are less advanced, and they 
show less concern for the quality of reports (no feedback to reports is provided). Since the 
“community” donors seek to support as many NPOs within a given community as possible, 
they shift their support for particular organizations frequently without referring very much to 
the reports provided. In such a context, the ability of an NPO to provide sufficient reports can 
only affect its overall reputation in the eyes of the “community” donor, but this will not in itself 
guarantee the stability of stable financial flows. 
The paper identifies both positive and negative impacts of donors’ financial accountability 
demands on NPO accountability practices. The positive outcomes include sanitary purposes, 
education purposes, and the increase of the financial discipline of the NPOs. The possible 
negative outcomes include the absence of a clear borderline between demanding information 
for reporting purposes and a direct intervention in organizational activities, reporting overload, 
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the inability to exercise control over spending (i.e.to spend the funds in the most efficient 
manner), and the framing  of NPOs activism by the concept of an ideal NPO-partner.  
Applying the lenses of institutional logics and the theory of attention on the intra-organizational 
level, the paper attempts to establish new connections between the prior research on nonprofit 
accountability (research that reveals abstract and multiple stakeholder demands) to the user-
oriented research on nonprofit accounting. By linking these two streams of accounting research, 
the paper, from one side, explores the accountability demands of various types of donors and 
the concrete mechanisms for satisfying these demands. From another side, the study supports 
the nonprofit accounting research that asserts the irrelevance of business accounting principles 
to the task of reporting on the nonprofit sector by bring forth new empirical evidence which 
supports such a claim.  
The paper provides also a methodological contribution to the qualitative user-need accounting 
research in the nonprofit sector. Inspired by Lapsley & Llewellyn (1995),  Arnaboldi & Azzone, 
(2004), Hellstrom & Lapsley (2016), the study reports that incorporation of  contextualized 
accounting data through the use  of the real-life construct within the interview design has 
permitted discovery of accounting emphases that  are currently demanded by  users but which 
are missing in annual financial statements. The method gives an opportunity to open the 
respondents for more discussion, because it pulls them from situations in which they seem 
forced to speak about the actual organizational practices into a hypothetically- constructed 
“what if” reality (wherein they feel more comfortable at offering their opinions and 
commentary.)  
Even though there is a strong need to develop accounting standards for nonprofits on national 
(and arguably) on international levels, there is always a question of its original purpose and 
beneficiaries. Not all accountability requirements can be satisfied by financial accounting and 
reporting information. In addition, not all stakeholders require financial accountability. 
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Empirical user-need oriented research in the nonprofit sector can facilitate an examination of 
the specific accounting needs of nonprofit sector stakeholders. This paper presents a case of an 
empowering nonprofit organization and its five donors who are embedded in the Norwegian 
institutional context. The findings of this study assert that institutional donors should be 
considered as a possible target group or an ideal-user group of financial reporting in the process 
of developing an accounting framework for the nonprofit sector. Observing and supporting 
diversity in the nonprofit sector with regard to types of NPOs and a variety of approaches to 
fundraising and signalling accountability, the author suggests exploring institutional donor-
NPO accountability and reporting relationships in a variety of organizational and institutional 
empirical settings. Moreover, further research could reveal how to incorporate the best practices 
of the supplementary reporting systems that are being created by donors into the framework of 
accounting standards.  
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Appendix 2.1 
Interview guide for institutional donors 
1. Please introduce yourself, your position and your main responsibilities in the 
organization where you work. 
2. Please explain the decision-making process for providing financial support to an NPO 
(you can use the Rafto Foundation as an example). 
3. What kind of information sources do you use in these processes? 
4. What kind of reports do you require NPOs to provide?  
5. What are the main key points you control/ focus on in provided reports?  
6. Are your decisions to support the organization in the future based on reporting targets? 
7. Do you have any concerns regarding existing reporting system? Is there any need for 
change? 
8. Do you study annual financial reports of NPOs applying for funding or reporting on 
prior donation? For which purposes? 
9.  On what kind of information do you focus when consulting the statements?  
10. What kind of (financial) information do you expect to find in the statements? Do you 
look for a general overview of your organization or do you expect to find certain 
particular information?  
11. Do you think the statement can inform you about the financial soundness of an NPO?  
12. Do you miss some information? What kind? 
13. Are all the concepts understandable for you?  
14. Do you think that all the concepts are relevant for NPOs?  
15. Do you provide any feedback to NPOs based on their annual financial statements? 
Evaluating the RLC: 
16. Do you find it useful if the financial statement contains information for the last three 
years? 
17. Do you find it useful if the overview of revenues and expenditures contains budgetary 
figures and the deviation between budgetary and accounting figures for the reporting 
year? 
18.  Do you find it useful that the overview of revenues and expenditures also contains 
change in net revenue in liquid assets (in the form of change in accounts receivable)? 
19. Do you prefer to have more details about the information disclosed in financial 
statements (for ex., the detailing of revenues and expenditures)?  Please provide 
examples. (An example if necessary, source of revenues, private/state; main 
purpose/fundraising/administrative expenses) 
20. Do you prefer that in addition to numerical information that some details of financial 
statements are visualized graphically or accompanied by verbal commentaries? Please 
elaborate on your answer.  
21. Do you want to suggest any other improvements in financial statements? 
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Appendix 2.2 
Document analysis 
Organization Document 
The Rafto Foundation - Annual reports 2013, 2014; 
- Annual financial statements 2013, 2014; 
- Annual budget 2013; 
- Annual ledger 2013; 
- Grant letter from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
concerning financial support for the Rafto Foundation 2013 – 
2015.  
Nonprofit association “The 
Freedom of Expression”  
- The Report to Nonprofit association “The Freedom of 
Expression” for the project support (form). 
Bergen Municipality - Grant portal: www.bergen.kommune.no/tilskudd 
- The Reporting Form 2015 
Regional Bank - Grant portal: https://www.spv.no/skjema/allmennyttige-
midler-soke-midler/prosjektinformasjon 
- Application for funds for charitable purposes;  
- Report Form: Funding for charitable purposes is used in 
conjunction with assigned grant (more than 250000 NOK) 
The Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs  
- Grant portal:  
http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/en/country?year=2016 
- Grant Management Manual. Management of Grants by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad; 
- Norwegian development assistance in numbers; 
- Final report for grants from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), S82 – Final report form for small 
scale grants; 
- Final report for grants from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), S81 – Final report form for 
project/programme support; 
- Progress report for grants from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), S61 – Progress report form for 
project/programme support; 
- Application for grants from the  Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), S01EN – Application form for 
project/programme support; 
-  Guide to filling in S51– Application form for project and 
programme support; 
- Grant Manual. Human rights. UN Department / Section for 
Human Rights and Democracy  
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Appendix 2.3 
OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS 
For 2013 
 
Result accounts 
 
  2013 2012 
Operating revenues 
Other operating revenue 7 733 316 7 386 435 
 
Operating expenses 
Inventory expense 1 988 094 2 277 555 
Wage expense 4 016 746 3 191 049 
Depreciation 65 901 77 589 
Other operating expense 1 391 412 1 401 053 
Total operating expenses 7 462 153 6 947 246 
Operating result 271 163 439 189 
 
Financial revenues and financial expenses  
Other financial revenue 86 259 52 230 
Other financial expense 1 003 115 
Net financial items 85 256 52 115 
Ordinary result before tax expense 356 419 491 304 
 
Annual result 356 419 491 304 
Transfers and disposals 
Transfer other equity 356 419 491 304 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Balance 
 
  31.12.2013 31.12.2012 
Fixed assets 
Long-term assets 
Building sites, buildings and  
Other fixed assets 284 058 331 372 
Operating assets, furniture, tools,  
Office machines etc. 32 354 11 725 
Total long-term assets 316 412 343 097 
Total fixed assets 316 412 343 097 
 
Current assets 
Accounts receivable 
Accounts receivables (customers) 36 999 533 898 
Other accounts receivables 17 849 31 992 
Total accounts receivables 54 848 565 890 
Bank and cash accounts 6 546 055 2 385 657 
Total current assets 6 600 903 2 951 547 
Total assets 6 917 315 3 294 644 
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Balance 
 
  31.12.2013 31.12.2012 
Equity 
Equity provided 
Basic capital 300 000 300 000 
Total equity provided 300 000 300 000 
 
Equity earned 
Other equity 2 143 649 1 787 230 
Total equity earned 2 143 649 1 787 230 
Total equity 2 443 649 2 087 230 
 
Liabilities 
Short-term debt 
Supplier debt 350 880 67 661 
Public charges 309 170 253 235 
Other short-term debt 3 813 616 886 518 
Total short-term debt 4 473 666  1 207 414 
 
Total liabilities 4 473 666 1 207 414 
Total equity and liabilities 6 917 315 3 294 644 
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Appendix 2.4 
Real-life construct  
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS (Monsen, 2015) 
For 2013 
 
Overview of revenues and expenditures for The Rafto Foundation 
 
Accounts  Budget Variance 
 2011 2012  2013 2013 2013 
    Ordinary activities 
    Revenues 
7,410,582 7,386,435 7,733,316 Operating revenue 7,108,123 625,193 
    Expenditures 
-3,391,958 -3,191,049 -4,016,746 Wage expenditure -3,734,240  -282,506 
-3.984,835 -3,678,608 -3,379,506 Operating expenditure -3,296,000  -83.506 
 33,789 516,778 337,064 A. Net ordinary activities 77,883  259,181 
 
    Investment activities 
 -24,825 -0 -39,216 Investment expenditure 0  -39,216 
 -24,825 0 -39,216 B. Net investment expenditure 0  -39,216 
 
   
    Financial activities 
 42,887 52,230 86,259 Financial revenue 50,000  36,259 
 -292 -115 -1,003 Financial expenditure 0  -1,003 
 42,595 52,115 85,256 C. Net financing revenue 50.000  35,256 
  
 51,559 568,893 383,104 Net revenue (A+B+C) 127,883  255,221  
 
    Change in liquid assets 
 51,559 568,893 383,104 Net revenue  
 86,878 -540,111 511,042 Change in accounts receivable   
 -93,797 -115,499 3,210,317 Change in short-term debt 
 48,426 32,291 55,935 Change in public charges 
 93,066 -54,426 4,160,398 Change in liquid assets 
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Overview of money status for The Rafto Foundation 
 
31.12.2011 31.12.2012 31.12.2013 
LIQUID ASSETS AND  
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
Cash/bank deposit 2,440,083 2,385,657 6,546,055 
Accounts receivable 25,779 565,890 54,848 
Total (A) 2,465,862 2,951,547 6,600,903 
 
SHORT-TERM DEBT 
Short-term debt 1,069,678 954,179 4,164,496 
Public charges 220,944 253,235 309,170 
Total (B) 1,290,622 1,207,414 4,473,666 
  
MONEY DEPOSIT 
Money deposit at 01.01 (A-B) 1,123,681 1,175,240 1,744,133 
Net revenue 51,559 568,893 383,104 
Money deposit pr. 31.12 (A-B) 1,175,240 1,744,133 2,127,237 
 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ABOUT FIXED ASSETS: 
Building sites, buildings and  
 other fixed assets 378,686 331,372 284,058 
Operating assets, furniture, tools 
 And office machines 42,000 11,725 32,354 
Total fixed assets 420,686 343,097 316,412 
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Essay 3: 
Mechanisms of Financial Reporting and Accounting Regulation for Foreign Funding 
Restrictions: A Case of Human Rights Organizations in Russia 
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Abstract 
Foreign funding of nonprofit organizations is restricted in more than fifty countries. Few of 
them mobilize accounting mechanisms of governance for these purposes. This paper explores 
the role of financial reporting and accounting regulation in foreign funding restrictions by 
analyzing the outcomes and consequences of an abrupt change of the financial reporting and 
accounting framework on the institutional field of human rights organizations in the case of the 
“foreign agents” law in Russia. By blending regulation of accounting and financial reporting 
practices with non-accounting mechanisms of discipline and control, the “foreign agents” law 
aims to increase legitimization of its regulatory actions. This study reveals that in certain socio-
political settings and with a moderate level of economic and regulatory system development, 
indirect accounting and financial reporting mechanisms of governance could effectively 
achieve the same outcomes in the nonprofit sector as could direct restrictions.  
 
Keywords: restrictions on foreign funding; financial accountability; human rights 
organizations; discipline; accounting change; institutional field change 
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3.1.INTRODUCTION 
In July 2012, two Russian nonprofit organizations (NPOs), Moscow Helsinki Group and For 
Human Rights, asked U.S. President Barack Obama to answer for them whether they are U.S. 
agents: 
We ask you, Mr. President, to give an answer to the question whether Moscow 
Helsinki Group and For Human Rights are U.S. agents in the standard sense of this 
word, i.e. whether MHG and For Human Rights are authorized to carry out the 
instructions of the U.S. government, whether the U.S. government influences, 
directly or indirectly, the work of our organizations…Our organizations can be put 
by the authorities on a list of foreign agents because we are actively involved in 
forming a public opinion with the aim to influence the government decision-
making in the interests of Russian citizens…Our organizations almost fully operate 
on grants from U.S. foundations, including the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) which is financed by the U.S. taxpayer. So under the new law, 
we will have to … get registered as 'an NGO performing the functions of a foreign 
agent,' in this particular instance, as an agent of the U.S. which acts as the principal, 
the letter said.4   
 
*** 
During the past fifteen years restrictions on foreign funding and cross-border funding of 
nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have appeared in more than fifty countries, mostly in emerging 
(transitional) and developing economies, such as China, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Russia (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013).Some restrictions can also be 
traced in a number of countries which have elaborate welfare systems, such as Canada and 
Israel (Dupuy, Ron & Prakash, 2014). From one perspective, international law is supposed to 
protect cross-border funding of NPOs from governmental interception (Rutzen, 2015); from 
another point of view, the power exercised by certain governments enables them simply to ban 
                                                            
4 Russian human rights activists write letter to Obama, July 25, 2012, Russia Beyond The Headlines RBTH, 
Interfax, http://rbth.com/articles/2012/07/25/russian_human_rights_activists_write_letter_to_obama_16664.html 
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or directly restrict foreign funding of NPOs. According to Christensen & Weinstein (2013): 
from 2005, laws prohibit empowering NPOs to receive more than 10% of foreign funding in 
Ethiopia; Belarussian NPOs need prior approval before receiving foreign funding; all foreign-
funded NPOs were closed down in Ecuador in 2012. Yet paradoxically, a few governments, 
such as those in India, Uruguay and Russia (see Dupuy et al., 2014), choose to apply indirect 
methods for the elimination of foreign funding, methods which include  advancing financial 
reporting and accounting regulation and specific requirements for NPOs.5  
Dupuy et al. (2014; 2016), who provide the most recent and complete international overview 
of legal restrictions on foreign funding in the nonprofit sector, assert that “future research 
should focus on examining the implications and enforcement of restrictive NGO finance laws 
to better understand their impact, as well the non-legal methods states use” (p. 9). From an 
accounting perspective, it is important to explore the role of financial reporting and accounting 
mechanisms in restricting foreign funding of NPOs and examine the nonprofit field and 
organizational responses.  
Aiming to achieve this purpose, the paper investigates the case of the “foreign agent” law in 
Russia. The new accounting regulation on nonprofit organizations that are engaged in “political 
activism” and funded by foreign donors was established in Russia in 2012. It complicates 
bookkeeping, increases the frequency and scope of reporting and governmental control, 
requires these organizations to register themselves as “foreign agents”, and applies substantial 
penalties that could result in the liquidation of these organizations. Due to these requirements, 
                                                            
5 According to the database of Dupuy et al. (2014) which consists of 45 countries that  restrict foreign funding of 
local NPOs, reporting requirements, supplemented by the requirements to obtain governmental approval or to 
follow certain procedures for receiving foreign funding are also applied in nine other countries (Bhutan, Burundi, 
Israel, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan).  However, only in India, Russia and 
Uruguay are special accounting requirements applied.  
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the Russian and international media began to label this law as the “foreign agent” law. This 
name is used throughout in this paper.  
This law contributes to two international trends: from one side, creating mechanisms for 
increasing accountability, transparency and disclosure for the nonprofit sector (McCarthy, 
2007; Guo & Saxton, 2007; Sloan, 2009;Verbruggen, Christiaens & Milis, 2011; Schmitz, 
Raggo & Vijfeijken, 2012) and, from another side, growing restrictions on foreign and cross-
border funding in the sector (Sidel & Moore, 2015; Christensen & Weinstein, 2013). The 
regulation is particularly focused on one type of NPO – human rights organizations (HROs). 
The law has had a significant dramatic effect on the operationalization of HROs in Russia. 
Traditionally, Russian HROs have been financed mainly by grants from large overseas 
foundations (Jakobson, Mersiyanova & Efremov, 2012). With the new regulations, this type of 
funding has to be renounced by HROs. Coping with the new regulations, HROs have had to 
conduct campaigns for collecting money from individual donors in Russia in order to operate 
their programs and pursue their organizational activities. This has led to a radical change of 
stakeholders and significant change in the format and shape of the organization’s accountability 
and its relationships with donors.  This has also raised the financial risk for their sustainable 
operationalization. The substantial financial penalties for non-compliance with the law has, in 
fact, already lead to the liquidation of several HROs.   
The case that is the focus of this study provides an opportunity to examine the consequences of 
an abrupt change of financial reporting and a significant alteration of the accounting framework 
in the nonprofit sector. More generally speaking, the paper contributes to an understanding of 
how change in accounting regulation could lead to specific transformations within a particular 
institutional field. 
The paper has the following structure. The next section contains a brief overview of power 
relationships between NPOs, their donors and the state and the emerging trend of governmental 
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restrictions over foreign funding of NPOs. Section 3 treats the specific purposes of accounting 
as a mechanism of governance, such as discipline and change in institutional (organizational) 
field, and reflects on the relationship of accounting regulation and the socio-political context in 
which such regulation applies. Section 4 explains the methodology and describes the data used 
in the study. Section 5 presents the case of the “foreign agents” law.  Section 6 analyzes the 
consequences of the implementation of the “foreign agents” law. Section 7 summarizes the 
discussion and presents concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. HROs, DONORS AND THE STATE.                                                      
RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN FUNDING 
Human rights organizations are a response of civil society to the serious problem of human 
rights violations. HROs themselves declare their purposes as: “monitoring and reporting of 
government [and private sector] behavior on human rights, particularly violations, building 
pressure and creating international machinery to end the violations and to hold governments 
[and businesses] accountable” (Gaer, 1995, p. 394).  
At the same time, states (represented by governmental authorities, parliaments and others who 
act on behalf of the particular state) and donors to the organizations are the most powerful 
stakeholders of HROs. White (1999) claims that “the relationship of the state and NGOs 
…cannot be understood simply as a one to one: it is always conducted in the shadow of a 
triangle with the donors” (p. 311).  
In contrast to other types of NPOs, such as charities or membership organizations, funding for 
HROs comes mostly from large institutional donors, such as the European Commission and 
United Nations Voluntary Fund, and private US foundations (Ford Foundation, National 
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Endowment for Democracy (NED), MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Foundations) for the 
implementation and support of concrete human rights projects.  
Applying logics of philanthropic appropriateness and outcomes, Ron, Pandya & Crow (2015) 
unpack the reasons that explain the fact that many HROs have to rely extensively on funding 
from foreign institutional donors and are usually not successful in conducting in-country 
fundraising:  
Donating to LHROs [local HROs] engaged in long-term social change efforts is not 
a taken-for-granted charitable behavior, unlike donating to traditional charities 
through religious mechanisms; entrenched philanthropic logics of appropriateness 
militate against giving to LHROs. These ingrained habits, combined with LHROs’ 
previous success at international fund-raising, and the high costs of launching new 
local fund-raising campaigns, have pushed LHROs toward international financial 
sources (p. 27).  
 
The scholars focus particularly on HROs from “the global South”, but their conclusions would 
also be appropriate for many developing and transitional economies. In addition, they identify 
public skepticism toward HROs and the poverty of the groups which would most likely to be 
interested in supporting HROs as among the reasons of for the underdeveloped state of in-
country funding. Given these conditions with regard to HROs and their funding, it is possible 
to agree with the claim of Assad & Goddard (2010), that “[institutional] donors … [are] the 
stakeholders with the highest salience as a result of which they significantly influenced 
accountability relationships and accounting processes and practices within NGOs.”  
Even given the importance of donors and their influence on NPOs, the state holds the most 
significant power in determining the legal and institutional frames of the NPO-donor 
relationships, and particular states are equipped with a wide variety of policy instruments for 
shaping the reality in which NPOs have to operate (Clark, 1995; Gill, 2016). In some countries, 
extensive foreign funding of national NPOs might be considered as an interference with the 
state’s sovereignty (Sen, 1999; White, 1999; Gershman & Allen, 2006; Gill, 2016; Christensen 
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& Weinstein, 2013) in the fields “where the NGO’s activities are controversial, where it 
challenges government decisions … or where its participatory approaches lead to the 
empowerment of groups which are traditionally exploited” (Clark, 1995).  
Sidel & Moore (2015), Christensen & Weinstein (2013) focus attention on the international 
trend of governmental restrictions on accepting and using foreign funding (primarily, monies 
coming from the U.S. and Western Europe) by local NPOs in Asia, Africa, South America and 
Post-Soviet states:  
Fully authoritarian regimes often openly repress independent NGOs …hybrid or 
democratizing regimes, however, often permit freedom of speech and association 
while finding other, more subtle ways to limit the scope and scale of independent 
groups (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013, p. 80) 
Christensen & Weinstein (2013) report that there is a reduction of more than 50 per cent in the 
amount of foreign financial aid in the countries where restrictive laws have been implemented. 
Dupuy et al. (2014) assert that the majority of the countries applying foreign fund restrictions 
are “very poor”6 with anocratic political regimes.7 Since this paper focuses on three countries 
where accounting mechanisms are mobilized for foreign funding restrictions, it could be useful 
to specify their characteristics according to the applied classifications. These countries contrast 
to the majority with regards to the both characteristics: Uruguay and Russia are belong to the 
group of high-income economies (India is a lower middle-income economy); Russia is defined 
as an open anocracy, India as a democracy and Uruguay as a full democracy. 
 
3.3.ACCOUNTING AS A MECHANISM OF GOVERNING 
Accounting and financial reporting regulation is named among the policy instruments which 
governments might use for creating operational settings for organizations and citizens, i.e. to 
                                                            
6 The scholars apply World Bank data. Currently the World Bank is using a concept of “low-income economies” 
for defining this group of countries. 
7 Defined in accordance with Polity IV data series, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html  
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govern economic life at a distance and to construct a governable person (Miller & O’Leary, 
1987; Rose & Miller, 1992; Neu, 2000; Mennicken & Miller, 2012). Considering accounting 
as a governing technology which is used as an indirect method of achieving specific purposes 
(Miller & Rose, 1990, 1992; Neu, 2000; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; Roberts, 1991), it would be 
logical to assume that a change of accounting policy or reporting regulation is prompted by a 
change in the governing strategy which a given state as a regulator seeks to apply. This section 
considers possible outcomes of change in financial reporting and accounting regulation 
characterized as a transformation of the institutional field of governable objects and disciplinary 
effect of accounting and reporting requirements. The section treats some specific aspects of the 
socio-political context in which accounting operates. 
 
3.3.1. Accounting change for institutional field change 
A phenomenon of accounting change (reform) viewed in its specific context has received 
significant attention by accounting researchers (Robson, 1991; Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood, 
1985; Potter, 2005; Andon, Baxter & Chua, 2007; Toms, 2005; Innes & Mitchell, 1990; Lapsley 
& Pallot 2000; Lüder, 1992; Monsen &Näsi, 1998).  This paper focuses specifically on the 
outcomes and consequences of accounting and reporting change for the organizational 
(institutional) field which, according to prior literature, are usually accompanied by notions of 
politics, legitimization (Ogden & Anderson, 1999) and  juridification (Laughlin & Broadbent, 
1993) of specified outcomes and mobilizations (Burns, 2000; Liguori & Steccolini, 2011) and 
shifts (Collier, 2001) of power.  
Traditionally, accounting practice has close and strong relations to legal and political 
environments in their different aspects (Neu & Graham, 2004; Laughlin & Broadbent, 1993; 
Ogden & Anderson, 1999). Ogden & Anderson (1999) asset the fundamental role of accounting 
regulation in legitimizing what one would be accountable for and signaling new expectations 
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of one’s responsibility. Laughlin & Broadbent (1993) discover interaction between regulatory 
law and accounting and its intervention in core organizational systems in the public sector in 
the UK: 
Law increasingly needs to be in a dynamic partnership with accounting to perform 
its complex regulatory role in certain areas… When law oversteps its defined 
structurally-coupled role … law can lead to… a disintegration of the organizational 
social systems or involve these systems in costly absorption processes…Thus, 
"politicized" accounting, which dominates ERA and NHSCCA, arguably can be 
seen as culpably guilty of deflecting attention from substantive issues which need 
debate in these institutions… These laws are heavily "constitutive" …and are 
perceived to be a life-threat to the core lifeworlds of these institutions ... As a result 
there is a real possibility that the changes will disintegrate these education and 
health institutions and fundamentally change their nature and/or lead to the 
disintegration of the political masters (pp. 338 -339, 363). 
 
Neu & Graham (2004) confirm the cooperation of accounting techniques and legislative 
initiatives for creating space for governmental interference in another socio-political context. 
Such interference could frequently lead to resistance from the governable objects when the 
change in accounting and financial reporting regulation is proposed by regulative context which 
is “out of line with [their] lifeworld expectations and wishes” (Broadbent, Jacobs & Laughlin, 
2001, p. 578).  
In order to implement new governing technologies, the regulatory body needs to have power. 
Rose & Miller (1992) analyzed the instruments of political power and claimed:  
To speak of the 'power' of a Government, a Department of State, a local authority 
… is to substantialize that which arises from an assemblage of forces by which 
particular objectives and injunctions can shape the actions and calculations of 
others (p. 184). 
 
The authors specify that these forces can be legal, architectural, professional, administrative, 
financial and judgmental. They stated that these forces could govern the actions and events on 
all economic levels: national economy, private firm, household and even individual person.  
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Consideration of accounting as a political instrument suggests the existence of different power 
(interest) groups of actors (Burchell et al., 1985; Hopwood, 1987; Markus &Pfeffer, 1983; 
Skærbæk & Melander, 2004; Scapens & Roberts, 1993). Collier (2001) discovered a shift in 
power between different actors which appears within accounting and reporting change (reform) 
by changing centers of accountability, taking power over decision-making, resource allocation 
and accountability demands from one actor and empowering the other actors.  
 
3.3.2. Accounting for disciplining 
Accounting as a regulatory technology includes both administrative and political components 
(Mennicken & Miller, 2012). Accounting legislation and information can appear to be a priori 
objective and truthful by providing certain forms of rationality (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; 
Roberts, 1991; Roberts & Scapens, 1985; Davie, 2005).  Such legislation and information can 
also equip accounting regulation with the power to identify, classify, categorize, order, judge 
(Neu & Graham, 2004), label, mark, and  stigmatize (Walker, 2008) and even blame (Skærbæk 
& Christensen, 2015). In other words, a disciplinary mechanism is embedded in accounting 
regulation and can represent given a government’s attempt to use a tactic of accounting 
regulation “to arrange things in such a way that certain ends are achieved” (Neu, 2000, p. 166).  
Because of this, it is crucial to distinguish between the particular standards and guidelines of 
accounting regulation and the function they may play in a given society (Burchell, Clubb, 
Hopwood, Hughes & Nahapiet, 1980).  
Discipline as a “general formula of domination and order” (Foucault, 1995, p. 137) and as a 
“corrective character of penalty” (Foucault, 1995, p. 8) in accounting regulation might be 
realized through the core elements of accountability “exclusion” and “self-absorption” (which 
leads to acceptance or resistance), as suggested by Roberts (1991). When talking about 
exclusion as a component of accountability relationships, Roberts (1991) asserts: 
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Real power [of exclusion] …is not so much around … who is excluded … but in its 
impact on those who witness the exclusion. For them, it is an example of what might 
happen. It traces out a possible future and thereby reinforces the weight of the 
standards by which they are judged. It reminds them of the conditional nature of their 
membership… [and] that their security depends upon their utility …The fear of 
exclusion …leads to a sort of self-absorption; it forces one back repeatedly to a 
concern with one’s own singular survival which depends upon meeting the standards 
that are set (p. 359). 
 
Davie (2005) uses the term “excludability” and claims that accounting exclusionary policy 
implies negative referencing (or selectiveness). Self-absorption which leads to the individual’s 
acceptance (absorption, willingness to satisfy expectations, standards) is crucial for the success 
of the disciplinary power effect (Roberts, 1991), which increases docility and self-discipline.  
 
3.3.3. Accounting and socio-political context 
Context plays an important role in understanding the nature of accounting change, reforms and 
regulation (Hopwood, 1983; Burchell et al., 1985; Miller, 1992; Napier, 2006; Potter, 2005; 
Pushkin & Pariser, 1991; Preston, 1992; Young, 2014), and a given situation determines the 
evaluation of any accounting governing incentive (Skærbæk & Melander, 2004) and its impact 
on society. Scholars claim that accounting is never neutral (Hoskin, 1994); accounting 
meanings and knowledge can be politically mediated (Jönsson &Macintosh, 1997) and 
connected to the technologies of political force (Neu, 2000; Neu & Graham, 2004) and national 
power (Miller, 1990). Considering accounting in a broad social context (Hopwood, 1992; 
Miller, 1994) and as “as an instrument for social management and change” (Burchell et al., 
1985), researchers point out its close relation to politics (Skærbæk & Melander, 2004). 
Davie (2005) who studied involvement of accounting instruments in the politics of racial 
exclusion, stated: 
It has been emphasized that accounting systems of social control embody and 
communicate radically different and conflicting rights, roles and obligations in 
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different ensembles of social relations …Accounting is not in itself racist, but can 
become racist through the context in which it is practiced (p.572 - 573). 
 
In order to contrast different types of socio-political context in which accounting mechanisms 
of governing might appear, this paper follows Dean (2002, 2010) who defines liberal and non-
liberal (authoritarian, hybrid) regimes of government. Liberal forms of governmentality aim to 
defend the “natural liberty of individuals” (Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009) and govern through tactics 
of freedom and independence. In contrast, the non-liberal forms of governmentality prioritize a 
distinct planning, administrative rationality, and collective interests over the individual 
(Hindess, 1996, 2001; Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009). Non-liberal governmentality questions “its 
subjects' capacity for action as subordinate to the expectation of obedience” and challenges the 
idea of limited government. Liberal and non-liberal governmentalities apply different levels of 
intervention onto the governable object. Non-liberal governmentality assumes the possibility to 
understand the governable object in all details and, therefore, prefers “direct and coercive 
interventions” rather than the “indirect methods of shaping human conduct” that are favored by 
the liberal approach. (Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009).  
Dean (2002) claims that “the opposition [distinction] between liberal and authoritarian 
governmentality is highly unstable” (Dean, 2002, p. 56) and notes that even liberal governments 
sometimes use authoritarian measures and instruments (Dean 2002, 2010; Hindess, 2001). 
Asserting the distinction between liberal and non-liberal governmentality regimes and 
mechanisms, this paper, however, proposes to avoid any over-simplification that may result 
from a description that too directly links governmentality and political regimes.  This 
qualification takes into account that non-liberal approaches of accounting and financial 
reporting regulation could appear in liberal economies under certain circumstances and liberal 
approaches can be seen in some non-liberal regimes. This corresponds to the earlier mentioned 
135 
 
work of Laughlin & Broadbent (1993) who showed that regulatory legislation could aim a high 
level of interference into the lifeworld of governable objects within certain settings.     
 
3.4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
This study analyzes a case of financial reporting and accounting regulation change that is faced 
by human rights organizations in Russia in the form of the establishment of the “foreign agents” 
law. The paper focuses on the organizational field of human rights activism in Russia 
represented by HROs, and it follows Ezzamel, Robson, Stapleton & McLean (2007) in its 
applied definition of an (organizational) field. 
The case under study has received extensive media coverage both in Russia and abroad. The 
researcher has observed the case over a period of five years (2011 – 2016) applying the method 
of document analysis (legislation and normative acts, expert and analytical reports, internal 
documents) and longitudinal media observation (newspapers, press-releases, online media, TV 
and radio, social-networking platforms, blogs, webpages of HROs) that covers all stages of the 
change (from the initial discussions regarding the law and its establishment, to its inception,  
realization and outcome). In addition, it should be noted that the author is affiliated on a long-
term basis with the community of HRO professionals that is the subject of the study, through 
an indirect involvement in the Russian human activism network. The author, however, has not 
ever been directly employed by or provided any paid/unpaid services to any Russian HRO. This 
indirect involvement provides access to this particular community, enhances the ability to 
understand the specific context in which the community functions and a capacity to use relevant 
language and terminology. This type of indirect involvement also allows the researcher to keep 
requisite scholarly distance from the objects under consideration. Interpretivist hermeneutic 
positions ground the study. 
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Taking into account the research objective and the specifics of the context in which the studied 
phenomenon takes place, the study applies documentary, archival record and media analysis as 
the main methodological instruments for this research. Yin (2003) names documentation and 
archival records among six sources of evidence within a case study. He asserts stability, 
unobtrusiveness, exactness and preciseness together with broad coverage as the strengths of 
this source of evidence; with retrievability, biased selectivity, reporting bias and accessibility 
listed as its potential weaknesses. In order to establish and enhance the validity of the method, 
Rowlinson (2004), Yin (2003) and Berg & Lune (2012) suggest that the researcher not consider 
the studied artefacts (documents, archival records, media) as sources of absolute truth, but work 
constantly to reveal the particular purpose and targeted audience of each document. In keeping 
with this advice, the author of this study constantly compared and contrasted the information 
from different media sources. The applied methodology permitted an exploration of a broad 
spectrum of opinions and enabled the researcher to follow the development of the particular 
situation, with its dynamics, multiplicity of individual cases, and features of transformation on 
the level of the institutional (organizational) field.    
 
3.5. THE CASE OF THE “FOREIGN AGENTS” LAW 
Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; analyze 
confused, massive of transient pluralities. Disciplinary space tends to be 
divided (Foucault, 1995, p. 143). 
*** 
The studies on social activism in Russia suggest a special classification of Russian NPOs with 
respect to this specific country. Summarizing the categorization of Henry (2006) and Cook & 
Vinogradova (2006), Crotty (2009) suggests three categories of NPOs in Russia:  
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- Government affiliates (or marionettes) which normally are highly institutionalized, 
created or affiliated with the state, actively supports the state’s agenda, funded from the 
state budget; 
- Grass roots organizations which normally are apolitical, focused on satisfying needs of 
the members or the local community, limited in funding and connections with overseas 
donors; 
- Professional organizations (or policy/advocacy organizations) which are grown from 
the former dissident movement, have broad international connections, strongly relying 
on overseas funding, in opposition (conflict) with state\government, politically 
adversarial, demanding political and social change. 
The independent Russian HROs which are studied in this paper belong to the final category of 
NPOs in the previous listing. 
Institutional and political contexts affect the level of respect for human rights. Cingrsnelli & 
Richards (2000) studied different approaches to measuring the impact (evaluating power) of 
HROs in different countries. As one of the possible mechanisms for such an evaluation through 
the measurement of “government respect for physical integrity rights” (p. 228), they refer to 
the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (see Wood & Gibney, 2010). The scale is computed by an 
independent expert analysis of the annual reports on the practice of human rights in various 
countries. Russia is consistently scored 4 out of 5 in PTS in most years since 1994. According 
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to the PTS, this means that “civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers 
of the population.”  
Development of the legislation regulating operational and financial activities of HROs in Russia 
went through several stages of ever-increasing and consistent tightening. The governmental 
control on Russian HROs rises along with the increasing power of HROs in Russian civil 
society (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Governmental control over HROs in Russia  
 
The first significant complexity in registration and reporting of HROs appeared in 2006 
simultaneously with the so-called “color revolutions” in post-soviet territories: Georgia in 2003, 
Ukraine in 2004 (Jakobson  et al., 2012). The next stage of legislative complexity took place in 
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2012. The Russian Law 121-FZ “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation 
regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organizations Performing the 
Functions of a Foreign Agent” (2012) further expanded the state control over empowering and 
advocacy NPOs that receive foreign funding, are involved in broadly defined political activism, 
and represent units of international HROs operating in Russia (HRW, 2013). “After 
removing…a number of specific activities from the scope of the law, what is left is obviously 
directed against HROs that receive foreign financing” (NHC, 2012; see also Appendix 3.1). 
According to the law, any type of published materials (including press and Internet releases) 
has to contain a mark that these materials are produced by organizations which “perform the 
functions of ‘foreign agents’” (HRW, 2013).  
Even though the “foreign agents” law has been formally established as accounting and financial 
reporting regulation, it contains, in fact, several different components, including bookkeeping, 
financial and activity reporting, accountability aspects (relationships with stakeholders, 
stakeholder salience),  and new control instruments (Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2: Components of the “Foreign agents” law 
 
140 
 
For instance, Article 2 of the “foreign agents” law is focused on amendments to the Federal law 
7-FZ “On nonprofit organizations”. Article 2 (5a) asserts: 
Annual accounting (financial) statements of nonprofit organization performing 
the functions of a foreign agent, and … annual accounting (financial) statements 
of the structural unit of foreign nonprofit organization shall be subject to an 
obligatory audit.8 
 
In this way, the new regulatory concept “nonprofit organizations performing the functions of a 
foreign agent” is integrated with ordinary financial reporting concepts, such as “annual financial 
statement” and “audit.” In addition, the same Article 2 (5m) refers to “a counteraction to 
legalization (laundering) of incomes from crime and financing of terrorism” as a background 
and outcome of the “foreign agents” law. This regulatory act also contains Article 2 (2) which 
provides a broad definition of political activism (“involvement in organizing and conducting 
political activities in order to influence decision-making of public authorities …as well as in 
shaping public opinion for the specified purposes”); and Article 3 which describes legal 
penalties for “creating a religious or voluntary association whose activities involve violation 
against citizens or …causing harm to their health.” 
Changes in bookkeeping, accountability, reporting and control in accordance with the “foreign 
agents” law are listed in Table 3.1 (Appendix 3.2). 
Since the 1990s when most of Russian HROs were established, foreign funding was crucial for 
Russian HROs because they could not get sufficient funding within Russia itself. The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), formerly the largest foreign sponsor of 
Russian NGOs, had to end all activities within Russian territory because of the establishment 
of the “foreign agent” law. USAID had worked in Russia for 20 years, spending around $2.7 
billion in grants, of which democracy support programs had accounted for about a third. Due 
                                                            
8 From this point on, translated from Russian by the author 
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to the fact that the accounting and reporting complexities initiated by the law are accompanied 
by the “foreign agent” status, the HROs demonstrated massive resistance to complying with the 
new law, and none of the HROs willingly sought the “foreign agent” status.9  
Mixing financial reporting and accounting routines with the contradictory concepts of “NPOs 
performing the functions of a foreign agent,” “NPOs involved in political activism,” “NPOs 
involved in money laundering and financing terrorism” and “NPOs created with the purpose of 
violation against citizens” under the umbrella of a singular regulatory act permits the legislating 
authority to make all elements and regulatory mechanisms seem more acceptable and legitimate 
in the eyes of the general public. In addition, such an approach creates a distinctive impression 
that there is a certain negative connotation to the advocacy, empowerment and activism of 
human rights efforts.    
 
3.6. CONSEQUENCES OF “FOREIGN AGENT” LAW 
3.6.1. Disciplining effect of the “foreign agents” law 
The “foreign agents” law provides new visibility and shapes new ways of governance and 
disciplining via mechanisms of excludability and selectiveness. By determining HROs as the 
main focus of the law, including categorizing some of these organizations within the “foreign 
agents” register and then practicing extensive inspections of these agents, all HROs are 
excluded from the community of NPOs which can take foreign funding without being claimed 
as “foreign agents,” and thus they cannot benefit by being exempted from the additional 
complicated accounting and reporting systems that are mandated by the new law. An absence 
of explicit legal definition of political activism and the selectiveness and ostentation of the 
“foreign agents” law application is supposed to send disciplinary signals to the broad 
                                                            
9 As on 10.03.2016, «foreign agent» register includes 122 empowering and advocacy NPOs (HROs). 
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community of civil society activists. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its report on the 
“foreign agents” law (2013) calls attention to its opacity, obscurity, and broad scope, which 
lead to its selective (i.e. discriminatory) implementation.  
Like its assessment of the level of intervention into the governable object in the case that is the 
focus of this study, Human Rights Watch (2013) reports that “the inspections [of the “foreign 
agents” law observance] were highly extensive, disruptive, and invasive, and seemed aimed at 
intimidating NGOs”. (p. 25). Such an evaluation puts into doubt any assumption by liberal 
governmentalists that “the disciplinary effect of accounting … is independent of physical and 
material sanctions” (Armstrong, 1994).  
The law has power  selectively to attach the label of “foreign agent” to each and every 
empowering and advocacy NPO (HROs), which due to its strong negative connotation has a 
powerful discrediting impact on the professional reputation of these organizations (HRW, 
2013). The foreign funding of an HRO once disclosed during in accounting report or during an 
investigation often prompts an extensive media coverage. The HROs report that this does not 
affect the opinion of the groups that need the support of the HRO (they continue to consume 
HRO services in the same volume as before the law’s establishment—if those organizations are 
still able to provide the services). These campaigns, however, do indeed affect those Russian 
supporters who aim to avoid direct public affiliation with HROs and want no disclosure of their 
donations or wish to provide untraceable support by offering their donations only in cash. 
In relation to self-absorption, Russian HROs do not accept (legitimize) the “foreign agents” law 
de jure. In 2013, 11 Russian HROs complained to the European Court of Human Rights against 
Russia and claimed that “the ‘foreign agents’ law violated their rights to freedom of association 
and expression that are protected under the European Convention on Human Rights” (HRW, 
2013). This position, supported by expert reports (HRW, 2013), claimed to provide the juridical 
proof that the “foreign agents” law is opposed to the Russian constitution and international 
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legislation.  Russian HROs, however, had to obey the “foreign agents” law de facto, but they 
complied not by their willing acceptance of its terms (which could be realized in the form of 
the continuation of foreign funding acceptance but with voluntary registering themselves as 
foreign agents), but by avoiding coming under the jurisdiction of altering their funding practices 
(most of the HROs operating in Russia declared officially that they would no longer accept 
foreign funding). 
 
3.6.2. Consequences for the institutional (organizational) field 
The establishment of the “foreign agents” law led to a significant change in the donor maps of 
HROs which had become accustomed to rely on funding from foreign institutions.  These 
organizations decided to renounce this funding in order to avoid the extensive scope of the 
jurisdiction of the new law. Figure 3.3 provides one example of the change of the donor map 
by using the publicly available data10 of the funding sources of the Moscow Helsinki Group in 
2012 and 2013.  
The press releases of Russian HROs and their foreign donors disclose that they were not 
prepared for such a dramatic change in accounting and financial regulation. Moreover, the 
“foreign agents” law did not allow for any transition period, and the long-term projects of the 
several Russian HROs financed from abroad had to be stopped due to the suspending events 
(force majeure) in this case. 
 
                                                            
10 Sources: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:GYTOVRbRVDEJ:www.mhg.ru/english/190c97f+&cd
=4&hl=ru&ct=clnk&gl=no;; http://www.mhg.ru/smi/13B6CFA2. 
144 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The stakeholders change: donors and partners of the Moscow Helsinki Group 
 
The rhetoric around the new law determined the increasing attention of media to the field of 
HROs and gave significant coverage to each step taken by HROs with regard to their adaptation 
to the new legal environment. In order to defend themselves, HROs had also increased their use 
of and presence in the media to explain their position and actions. For instance, the author was 
able to track and comment on the media discourse of the coping strategy of the Moscow 
Helsinki Group (MHG).  
A research and analytical think-tank, the Institute of Modern Russia, states in August 2013: 
The Helsinki Group’s chair, Lyudmila Alekseeva, proudly declared that her 
organization would never register as a “foreign agent”—but by renouncing its 
foreign funding, the Group as good as complied with the law on NGOs. One can 
put a brave face on a sorry business for as long as one wishes, but the fact 
remains: the Moscow Helsinki Group complied with an illicit act of legislation 
and accepted the rules of the game imposed by the regime (Podrabinek, 2013). 
 
In her interview with the National News Service in October 2014, Alekseeva stated:  
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We are just surviving at the moment… We are grateful for the presidential grant, 
of course, but it is a much smaller sum than the funding we used to have. We 
have had to stop our most expensive awareness-raising programs … Once, 
…[MHG] used to hold summer schools and winter schools on human rights, 
which trained 340 people. …We can't do that any longer ...The monitoring 
programs, our primary activity, can be carried out by volunteers. Of course, 
volunteers work less effectively because they cannot dedicate themselves 
completely to the task … Presidential grants are given to far fewer organizations 
and supply much less money than we used to receive from foreign sponsors 
(Rights in Russia, 2014). 
 
This public statement discloses that the strategy of the MHG contains, in particular, a 
renunciation of foreign funding, closing the most expensive programs, attracting volunteer 
labor and applying for the presidential grants. Such public statements of several HROs that the 
author followed for the five-year period have been taken as the background for the analysis 
presented in Table 3.2 (Appendix 3.3). The table shows three alternative scenarios that were 
applied by the HROs to address the impact of the four stages of the “foreign agents” law on this 
institutional field.     
At the present time, the foreign donor network for Russian HROs is destroyed and does not 
exist officially. HROs found new sources of financial support in state grants and non-systematic 
donations from Russian business and individuals. The size of this support is significantly 
smaller than that provided previously by the foreign donors. The lack of philanthropy traditions 
and an absence of supportive legislation in Russia (especially in the human rights sector), 
together with the discrediting impact of media campaigns which affected the Russian donors 
and a paucity of institutional funds in Russia to support human rights activism have contributed 
to the reality that the majority of “new” Russian donors does not support Russian HROs 
systematically and, consequently, these donors do not signal any accountability demands. The 
non-systematic donations are usually based on impulse and an intention to support the specific 
human rights defender who has a well-established personal reputation.  
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The state grants lack transparency in the selecting process and its criteria for accountability 
within a reporting system. It appears that the formal reporting system for the grant holders is 
based on the reporting system for the foreign grants; it is, however, much less complicated. For 
example, HROs representatives signal the in media that the civil servants (on behalf of state) 
demonstrate less interest in the HROs’ grant reports than did the foreign grant providers 
previously. In brief: the absence of clear and specific accountability mechanisms for 
communication with Russian non-state donors inhibits the development of a coherent set of 
fundraising strategies for Russian HROs, under the current legislative regime. 
As of March 2016, one HRO Agora (an association of 35 lawyers dealing with power abuse 
cases) has been liquidated by the Supreme Court responding to a request from the Ministry of 
Justice in compliance with the “foreign agents” law. Over the last two years, Agora experienced 
intensified tax inspections and accusations of tax evasion. Agora received the “foreign agent” 
status in 2014, together with 77 other HROs, after the prosecutors’ investigation. The 
prosecutors claim that Agora receives funding from abroad and is involved in political activism. 
Agora appealed in court, but the court has rejected the appeals. In the same year, “the “foreign 
agents” law precluded Agora from accepting the monetary contribution awarded as part of the 
Rafto Prize Foundation for human rights work” (NHC, 2016). Further inspections of Agora lead 
to the liquidation request of the Ministry of Justice which argued that Agora influenced public 
opinion and published information materials without marking them with its “foreign agents” 
status. Moreover, dissatisfaction of inspectors with the quality of the financial reporting and the 
control systems in Agora has also been mentioned as a reason for the liquidation of the 
organization. Another HRO, the election watchdog Golos, is undergoing a similar process of 
liquidation. In addition, the Russian media signals the risk that similar liquidation schemes 
would also be applied to other HROs. These cases express a shift of power regarding the shape 
of accountability for HROs—from donors to regulators and empowered inspectors. 
147 
 
3.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper aims to contribute to the critical accounting literature (Neu, 2000; Davie, 2005; Neu 
& Graham, 2004; Funnell, 1998) by examining   the role of accounting in a different modern 
socio-political context and empirical setting than those with a liberal pattern of governance and 
regulatory environment.  It explores the spectrum of governing purposes to which accounting 
and financial reporting mechanisms could be applied as well as the interplay between 
accounting with its notions of juridification and politics(Miller, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; 
Skærbæk & Melander, 2004) and power expressed in the larger social arena (Burns, 2000; 
Collier, 2001). The study showed how financial reporting and accounting mechanisms could be 
mobilized in non-liberal  settings of governmentality for achieving certain outcomes in the 
nonprofit sector, in particular by restricting foreign funding flows and reducing cooperation 
between HROs and foreign institutional donors.  
Compared to other instruments for reducing foreign funding of NPOs that are applied in 
different countries, the case of Russian HROs has its own specifics including the application of 
indirect mechanisms of accounting and financial reporting regulation instead of directly 
banning or restricting. Contributing to two oppositely directed international trends (in one trend, 
increasing the transparency of the nonprofit sector and in another trend restricting foreign 
funding), the “foreign agents” law aims to achieve a high level of legitimization of the 
regulatory actions in comparison  to that could be achieved by the direct restrictions. This shows 
that even in non-liberal contexts indirect methods of governance might well achieve the 
necessary outcomes. For this to take place, however, certain conditions have to appear. The 
paper provides new evidence in support of the social research claim that hybrid and 
democratizing regimes are looking for more delicate mechanisms for the governance and 
control of the nonprofit sectors of their societies as compared to the mechanisms pursued within 
fully-authoritarian regimes (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013). By showing the contrast among 
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aspects of income and between characteristics of the political systems of Russia, India and 
Uruguay and other countries, the paper notes that, at a minimum, a moderate level of legislation 
and regulatory system development is required for achieving the purpose of restricting the 
foreign funding of HROs through the mobilization of indirect accounting mechanisms of 
governance.   It should also be noted that even though the paper asserts certain similarities 
among the counties which mobilize accounting mechanisms of governance for foreign fund 
restrictions, the study does not attempt to provide any statistical generalizations. 
The establishment of the “foreign agents” law has led to a very rapid and abrupt change in 
financial reporting and accounting framework. As a result, the actors have not been well 
prepared for the change, and they have not had adequate time for adaptation and transition. The  
case does demonstrate stakeholder changes and clear shifts in power from foreign donors to the 
state (represented by the regulators and inspectors) within the institutional field of human right 
activism in Russia. These shifts are determined by the transformation of the centers of 
accountability, empowerment of the state actors to satisfy their accountability demands and 
taking this ability away from the foreign donors.  The newer Russian non-state donors are fairly 
passive and do not demand accountability from  HROs.  
The opacity of the “foreign agents” law, the selectiveness of its implications and enforcement, 
new visibilities (such as, the status of “foreign agents” and the “foreign agents” register) for 
exclusion, as well as the application of the new accounting regulation in the context of 
administrative hurdles (obstacles) that empower external controllers, deep interventions into 
the lifeworld of the governable objects, and the achievement of specific outcomes, signal the 
disciplinary effect of the law even though this goal is not explicitly declared by the  setters of 
the legislation. A massive resistance to the law is demonstrated de jure; however, self-
absorption and self-discipline are also recognized de facto.  
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The consequences of the human rights movement and HROs’ operationalization in Russia 
within last twenty years, in particular, with its too-strong reliance on foreign funding and paid 
employees, the lack of traditions of philanthropy and a recognizable cohort of sustainable 
Russian donors that could support HROs, have resulted in the vulnerability of this sector which 
has been heightened by the implementation of the “foreign agents” law. After experiencing 
shock in the abrupt changes, Russian HROs are now starting to adapt to the new realities. Some 
HROs, however, have had to be liquidated, others have gone on the “sleeping mode”, while still 
others struggle to reduce their own vulnerability by attracting new donors and local funding in 
the unfavorable socio-political and regulatory environment.  
As recently emerged phenomena, our understanding of accounting and financial reporting 
mechanisms mobilized for foreign funding restrictions could certainly benefit from further 
research. The present study bases its analysis on publicly available documents and media 
sources. Closer interaction with the field and applying ethnographic methods of research might 
reveal further insights regarding the coping and adaptation strategies of HROs. Such 
interrogations would need to be planned wisely and take into account the socio-political 
environment in which the studied objects operate. In addition to the “foreign agents” law in 
Russia, accounting and financial reporting regulation is applied for foreign fund restriction in 
India and Uruguay. In this international context, the present study could be used as a 
background for comparative studies among various institutional settings.  Such study could 
enrich our knowledge of the implications of accounting and financial reporting mechanisms on 
foreign fund restrictions in the nonprofit sector.     
 
 
 
150 
 
REFERENCES  
Andon, P., Baxter, J. & Chua, W.F. (2007), Accounting change as relational drifting: A field 
study of experiments with performance measurement. Management Accounting Research, 18: 
273–308.  
Armstrong, P. (1994), The influence of Michael Foucault on accounting research. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 5: 25 – 55. 
Assad, M. & Goddard, A.  (2010), Stakeholder salience and accounting practices in Tanzanian 
NGOs. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 23: 276-299. 
Berg, B. L. & Lune, H. (2012), Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, Pearson, 
New Jersey.  
Broadbent, J., Jacobs, K. & Laughlin, R. (2001), Organizational resistance strategies to 
unwanted accounting and finance changes. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 14: 
565 – 586. 
Burchell, S., Clubb, C. & Hopwood, A. G. (1985), Accounting in Its Social Context: Towards 
a History of Value Added in the United Kingdom, Accounting, Organizations and Society: 381-
-413. 
Burchell, S., Clubb. C., Hopwood, A. G., Hughes, J. & Nahapiet, J. (1980), The Roles of 
Accounting in Organizations and Society. Accounting, Organizations and Society: 5-27. 
Burns, J. (2000), The dynamics of accounting change Inter-play between new practices, 
routines, institutions, power and politics. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 13: 
566 – 596. 
Christensen, D. & Weinstein, J.M. (2013), Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs. 
Journal of Democracy, 24: 77 – 91.  
151 
 
Cingranelli, D. L.  & Richards, D.L.  (2001), Measuring the impact of human rights 
organizations. In Claude E. Welch, JR. (ed.), NGOs and Human Rights. Philadelphia: Penn, 
225 – 237.  
Clark, J. (1995), The State, Popular Participation, and the Voluntary Sector. World 
Development, 23: 593-601.  
Collier, P.M. (2001), The power of accounting: a field study of local financial management in 
a police force. Management Accounting Research, 12: 465–486. 
Cook, L.J. & Vinogradova, E. (2006), NGOs and Social Policy-Making in Russia’s Regions. 
Problems of Post-Communism, 53 (5): 28 – 41. 
Crotty, J. (2009), Making a Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia. 
Europe-Asia Studies, 61 (1): 85 – 108.  
Davie, S.S.K. (2005), The politics of accounting, race and ethnicity: a story of a Chiefly-based 
preferencing. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 16 (5): 551–577. 
Dean, M. (2002), Liberal government and authoritarianism. Economy and Society, 31 (1): 37–
61. 
Dean, M. (2010) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, Second edition.  
London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Dupuy, K. Ron, J. & Prakash, A. (2016), Hands off my regime! Governments’ restrictions on 
foreign aid to non-governmental organizations in poor and middle-income countries. World 
Development, 84: 299–311. 
Dupuy, K. Ron, J. & Prakash, A. (2014), Stop Meddling in my Country! Governments’ 
Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations. Working paper.  
152 
 
Ezzamel, M., Robson, K., Stapleton, P., McLean, C. (2007), Discourse and institutional change: 
‘Giving accounts’ and accountability. Management Accounting Research, 18: 150–171. 
Federal Law “On Making Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation 
Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Noncommercial Organizations Performing the 
Functions of Foreign Agents,” No. 121-FZ, 2012, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
http://www.rg.ru/2012/07/23/nko-dok.html  
Foucault, M. (1995), Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison, New York: Random House.  
Funnell, W. (1998), Accounting in the service of the Holocaust. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 8: 435 – 464.  
Gaer, F. (1995), Reality check: human rights nongovernmental organisations confront 
governments at the United Nations. Third World Quarterly, 16: 389 – 404. 
Gershman, C. & Allen, M. (2006), The assault on democracy assistance. Journal of Democracy, 
17: 36 – 51.  
Gill, T.M. (2016), The Venezuelan Government and the Global Field: The Legislative Battle 
over Foreign Funding for Nongovernmental Organizations. Sociological Forum, 31: 29 – 52.  
Guo, C. & Saxton, G. (2007), Accountability online: The web as an accountability-building 
tool for nonprofit organizations. Paper presented at The 9th National Public Management 
Research Conference, October, Tucson.  
Henry, L. A. (2006), Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia: Leadership, 
Organisational Diversity and Innovation. Post-Soviet Affairs, 22 (2): 99-124. 
Hindess, B.  (2001), The liberal government of unfreedom. Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political, 26 (2): 93–111. 
Hindess, B. (1996), Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, Oxford: Blackwell. 
153 
 
Hopwood, A. G. (1987), The Archeology of Accounting Systems. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 12 (3): 207 - 234. 
Hopwood, A.G. (1983), On Trying to Study Accounting in the Contexts in which it Operates. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society: 287–305. 
Hopwood, A.G. (1992), Accounting calculation and the shifting sphere of the 
economic. The European Accounting Review, 1 (1): 125–143 
Hoskin, K.  (1994), Boxing clever: For, against and beyond Foucault in the battle for accounting 
theory. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 5: 57 – 85.  
Human Rights Watch (2013), Laws of Attrition. Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after 
Putin’s Return to the Presidency. Report. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia0413_ForUpload_0_0.pdf 
Innes, J.  & Mitchell, F. (1990), The process of change in management accounting: some field 
study evidence. Management Accounting Research, 1: 3 – 19.  
Jakobson L. I., Mersiyanova I. V., Efremov S. (2012), Challenges and new trends for 
nonprofit accountability in Russia. Working papers by NRU Higher School of Economics. 
Series PA "Public Administration" (3): 
http://www.hse.ru/pubs/lib/data/access/ram/ticket/46/142782498622da49eb65c8418eb6789f0
dfa328ce0/03PA2012.pdf  
Jeffreys, E. & Sigley, G. (2009), Governmentality, governance and China. In E. Jeffreys, 
“China’s governmentalities: governing change, changing government”, Routledge, Hoboken.   
Jönsson, S. & Macintosh, N.B. (1997), CATS, RATS, AND EARS: Making the case for 
ethnographic accounting research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22 (3 – 4): 367–386. 
154 
 
Lapsley, I. & Pallot, J. (2000), Accounting, management and organizational change: A 
comparative study of local government. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 11, Is. 2, pp. 
213–229. 
Laughlin, R. & Broadbent, J. (1993), Accounting and law: partners in the juridification of the 
public sector in the UK? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 4: 337 – 368.  
Liguori, M. & Steccolini, I. (2011), Accounting change: explaining the outcomes, interpreting 
the process. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 25: 27 – 70. 
Lüder, K.G. (1992), A Contingency Model of Governmental Accounting Innovations in the 
Political Administrative Environment. Research In Governmental And Nonprofit Accounting, 
Vol. 7, Pages 99-127. 
Markus, M.L. & Pfeffer, J. (1983), Power and the design and implementation of accounting and 
control systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8 (2–3): 205–218. 
McCarthy, J. (2007), The ingredients of financial transparency. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 36: 156-164. 
Mennicken, A. & Miller, P.  (2012), Accounting, territorialization and power. Foucault Studies, 
13: 4 – 24.  
Miller, P. (1994), Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice: an Introduction. In Hopwood, 
A.G. and Miller, P. (Eds.), Accounting as social and institutional practice. (Cambridge 
University Press). 
Miller, P. (1990), On the interrelations between accounting and the state. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society,  15 (4): 315–338. 
Miller, P.  & O’Leary, T. (1987), Accounting and the Construction of the Governable Person. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society: 235-265. 
Miller, P. & Rose, N. (1990), Governing Economic Life. Economy and Society, 19: 1-31. 
155 
 
Monsen, N. & Näsi, S. (1998), The Contingency Model of Governmental Accounting 
Innovations: a discussion. The European Accounting Review, 7 (2): 275-288.  
Napier, C.J. (2006), Accounts of change: 30 years of historical accounting research. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31: 445–507.  
Neu, D. & Graham, C. (2004), Accounting and the holocausts of modernity. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 17: 578 – 603.  
Neu, D. (2000), “Presents” for the “Indians”: land, colonialism and accounting in Canada. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 25 (2): 163 – 184.  
Norwegian Helsinki Committee NHC (2012), Annual Report. 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee NHC (2016), Norway must address NGO liquidation in Russia 
http://nhc.no/no/nyheter/Norway+must+address+NGO+liquidation+in+Russia.b7C_wlvQ4t.i
ps 
Ogden, S.G.  & Anderson, F. (1999), The role of accounting in organizational change: 
promoting performance improvements in the privatized UK water industry. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 10, 91 – 124.  
Podrabinek, A. (2013), The Choice of Agents, Institute of Modern Russia, 
http://imrussia.org/en/society/528-the-choice-of-agents 
Political Terror Scale http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php 
Potter, B. N. (2005), Accounting as a Social and Institutional Practice: Perspectives to Enrich 
our Understanding of Accounting Change. ABACUS,41:265 – 289.  
Preston, A.M. (1992), The Birth of Clinical Accounting: A Study of the Emergence and 
Transformations of Discourses on Costs and Practices of Accounting in U.S. Hospitals. 
Accounting Organizations and Society, 17:63-100.  
156 
 
Pushkin, A.B. & Pariser, D.B. (1991), Political and Economic Forces Shaping Regulatory 
Accounting for Troubled Debt Restructuring. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2:127 – 143.  
Rights in Russia (2014), NGOs receive presidential grants (Moscow Helsinki Group)  
http://groups.rightsinrussia.info/news/moscowhelsinkigroup-2 
Roberts, J. (1991), The possibilities of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
16 (4): 335 – 338.  
Roberts, J. & Scapens, R. (1985), Accounting Systems and Systems of Accountability — 
understanding accounting practices in their organizational contexts, Accounting Organizations 
and Society, 10 (4): 443 - 456. 
Robson, K. (1991), On the arenas of accounting change: the process of translation. 
Accountmg organizations and society, 16:547 – 570. 
Ron, J., Pandya, A. & Crow, D. (2015), Universal values, foreign money: funding local human 
rights organizations in the global south, Review of International Political Economy, 1 – 35.  
Rose, N. & Miller, P. (1992), Political power beyond the state: Problematics of government. 
British Journal of Sociology, 43: 173 - 205. 
Rowlinson, M. (2004), Historical analysis of company documents, in Cassell, C. and Symon, 
G. (Eds), Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research, Sage, London, 
301-11. 
Rutzen, D. (2015), Aid barriers and the rise of philanthropic protectionism. International 
Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 17: 5 – 44. 
Scapens, R.W. & Roberts, J. (1993), Accounting and control: a case study of resistance to 
accounting change. Management Accounting Research, 4 (1): 1 – 32.  
157 
 
Schmitz, H., Raggo, P. & Vijfeijken, T. (2012), Accountability of transnational NGOs: 
Aspirations vs. practice. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41: 1175-1194. 
Sen, S. (1999), Some Aspects of State-NGO Relationships in India in the Post-Independence 
Era, Development and Change,30: 327-355. 
Sidel, M. & Moore, D. (2015), The Law Affecting Civil Society in Asia: Developments and 
Challenges for Nonprofit and Civil Society Organizations. Report prepared by the International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)                                                                              
https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/fjfgn/SidelMooreICNLAsiaLawAug2015.pdf 
Skærbæk, P. & Christensen, M. (2015), Auditing and the purification of blame. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 32: 1263 – 1284. 
Skærbæk, P. & Melander, P. (2004), The politics of the changing forms of accounting, 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 17 (1): 17 – 40.  
Sloan, M. (2009), The effects of nonprofit accountability ratings on donor behavior. Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38: 220-236.  
Toms, J.S. (2005), The rise of modern accounting and the fall of the public company: the 
Lancashire cotton mills 1870-1914. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27: 61 – 84.  
Verbruggen, S., Christiaens, J.  & Milis, K. (2011), Can resource dependence and coercive 
isomorphism explain nonprofit organizations' compliance with reporting standards? Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40: 5–32. 
Walker, S.P. (2008), Accounting, paper shadows and the stigmatised poor. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 33 (4-5): 453–487. 
White, S.C. (1999), NGOs, Civil Society, and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of 
Representing the Poor. Development and Change, 30 (2): 307 – 326. 
158 
 
Wood, R.M. & Gibney, M. (2010) The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a 
Comparison to CIRI. Human Rights Quarterly, 32 (2): 367-400. 
Yin, R.K. (2003). Case Study Research. Design and Methods, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks. 
Young, J.J. (2014), Separating the Political and Technical: Accounting Standard-Setting and 
Purification. Contemporary Accounting Research, 31: 713–747.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
Appendix 3.1 
 
Source: http://rapsinews.com/legislation_mm/20120720/263859140.html 
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Appendix 3.2 
Table 3.1 - Changes according to the “foreign agents” law 
Before  After 
Financial reporting 
Russian accounting system consists of two 
different types of accounting for all groups of 
organizations: tax accounting and book-keeping 
accounting.  
In addition to the general financial statements, 
NPOs submit separate reports on funding sources 
and expenditures to the Tax Authority and the 
Ministry of Justice. 
New additional forms of financial reporting. 
For HROs: more frequent reporting (report on the 
management team and activities – every half of the 
year; expenditure reports every three months) and 
inspections. Other types of NGOs which stay beyond 
the coverage the new law have to submit these reports 
once a year. 
Conduct a compulsory annual audit11. 
HROs reported to each donor (commonly, foreign 
institutional funds) separately according to the 
reporting forms provided by the donors.  
 
Bookkeeping 
 Separate bookkeeping for expenditures of funds 
received from foreign donors and from the Russian 
donors. 
Financial accountability 
 The extremely high level of financial vulnerability due 
to the significant revenue cut and elimination of existed 
funding sources. 
Project accountability to the institutional donors, 
which constantly affects the resource inflows.  
An opportunity for HROs to affect their 
accountability reporting and to negotiate with the 
partners\donors.   
New types of stakeholders (individual donors), new 
users’ needs. 
Lack of accountability tools. 
Lack of possibilities for HROs to affect their 
accountability reporting. 
Control 
 
 
 
Inspections by governmental authorities once in 
three years 
High level of accountability to the government. 
For HROs annual inspections by governmental 
authorities; plus practice of “unannounced” 
inspections. Other NPOs: inspections once in e years. 
The government gains the power of a suspension 
decision (up to 6 months) to HROs which fail to 
comply with new law; administrative sanctions: failure 
to submit complete activity report on time – fine 
approx. equivalent to 60012 euro/ 6000 euro13, failure 
to register as a “foreign agent” or failure to notice 
“foreign agent” status in published materials – fine 
6000 euro/ 10000 euro; personal criminal 
responsibility for employees - from the fine 6000 euro 
to up to two-year prison sentence. 
 Source: based on materials of Russian Law No. 121-FZ; HRW, 2013 
                                                            
11 This innovation could be considered as positive; however, in fact, auditing service is quite expensive in Russia, 
and the audit requirement leads to significant resource outflows from the limited resources of Russian HROs. 
12 As on 28.03.2015. 
13 From this point on, individuals/ organizations. 
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Appendix 3.3 
Table 3.2 - HROs lifecycle under the “foreign agents” law. Effect of the “foreign agents” law 
on the human rights movement in Russia 
 HROs lifecycles 
1st stage: Initial 
response 
Do not take any foreign money (including awards, prizes, etc.):  
self-discipline, docility in order to avoid reputational damage 
2nd stage: Coping 
strategies I 
“Sleeping mode”, 
significant reduction 
in activism 
Re-orientation to 
national funding, 
acceptance of 
governmental grants, 
compromising 
missions, reduction 
of activism since the 
amount of national 
funding is 
significantly lower 
than provided by the 
foreign sources  
“Foreign agents”, 
as on 08.03.2016, 
122 HROs have been 
placed in the 
“foreign agents” 
register as a result of 
governmental 
investigations. Most 
of HROs claim that 
they do not accept 
foreign funding; 
however, even the 
trace of 
prizes/premiums that 
supplement human 
rights awards can be 
classified as foreign 
funding  
2nd A stage: Coping 
strategy II 
On a longer term, all three types are trying to build human rights 
philanthropy and crowd-funding in Russia, but this is complicated 
due to the lack of traditions, low public interest, the lack of 
accountability instruments, an under-developed civil society, and 
the negative connotation of the affiliated concepts “foreign agent” 
and “political activism”  
3rd stage: Penalties   Multiple fines are 
applied for non-
compliance with the 
legislation; and there 
is reputational 
damage. Most of 
HROs are not able to 
pay the fines  
4th stage: 
Result/Outcome 
No human rights 
activism  
due to the lack of 
resources 
No human rights 
activism  
due to compromising 
missions and visions 
and the lack of 
resources 
No human rights 
activism  
due to bankruptcy 
and liquidation 
 
